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Abstract
Why do individuals make different decisions when confronted with similar choices? This paper in-
vestigates whether the answer lies in an evolutionary process. Our analysis builds on recent work
in evolutionary game theory showing the superiority of a given type of preferences, homo moralis,
in fitness games with assortative matching. We adapt the classical definition of evolutionary stabil-
ity to the case where individuals with distinct preferences in a population coexist. This approach
allows us to establish the characteristics of an evolutionarily stable population. Then, introducing
an assortment matrix for assortatively matched interactions, we prove the existence of a heteroge-
neous evolutionarily stable population in 2 × 2 symmetric fitness games under constant assortment,
and we identify the conditions for its existence. Conversely to the classical setting, we find that the
favored preferences in a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population are context-dependent. As an
illustration, we discuss when and how an evolutionarily stable population made of both selfish and
moral individuals exists in a prisoner’s dilemma. These findings offer a theoretical foundation for the
empirically observed diversity of preferences among individuals.
Keywords: Social Preferences, Homo moralis, Preference evolution, Evolutionary Game Theory,
Evolutionary stability, Assortative matching, Homophily
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1. Introduction
Although commonly used in the economic literature, the hypothesis of rational agents all pursuing
their self-interest fails to explain the diversity of human behaviors (Henrich et al., 2001). Empirical
evidence shows that individuals make different decisions when confronted with similar choices. This
has been observed in various contexts such as voting behavior (Piketty, 1995), altruism (Andreoni
and Miller, 2002), environmental consciousness (Schlegelmilch et al., 1996), risk aversion and saving
choices (Burks et al., 2009), health expenditure (Hitiris and Posnett, 1992) and the selection of
a life partner (Eastwick and Finkel, 2008), suggesting the existence of distinct preferences among
individuals. The diversity in the social behavior of chimpanzees (Van Leeuwen et al., 2012) hints at
the possibility of an evolutionary origin behind this heterogeneity. Our goal in this paper is to assess
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the evolutionary foundation of the coexistence of more than one type of preference in a population,
and to evaluate what types of preferences prevail when they exist.
Scholars have long challenged the choice of selfish utility in economics. Ever since Smith (1759)
suggested moral motives in his Theory of moral sentiments, economists have considered several al-
ternative preferences such as altruism (Becker, 1974b), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), fairness (Rabin,
1993), empathy (Stark and Falk, 1998), reciprocity (Fehr and Gächter, 1998), reciprocal altruism
(Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or morality in the Kantian sense1 (Laf-
font, 1975; Brekke et al., 2003). Recently, Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016) have provided a theoretical
justification for the latter. In a model of preference evolution under incomplete information and
assortative matching, they show that a new type of preference, called homo moralis, arises endoge-
nously as the most favored by evolution. A homo moralis individual maximizes a weighted sum of
her selfish homo oeconomicus payoff and of her moral payoff, defined as the payoff that she would get
if everybody acted like her.2
The homo moralis preferences elegantly tackle the shortcomings of selfish preferences. However,
building on the classical definition of evolutionary stability by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), Alger
and Weibull (2013, 2016) investigate the survival of only one type of preference in the society. When
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1974) laid the foundation of evolutionary
game theory, they intended to identify the strategy providing an evolutionary advantage in animal
conflicts between members of a given species. To do so, they defined the concept of evolutionarily
stable strategy, a strategy adopted by most of the members of a population (called the "resident"
strategy) giving a higher reproductive fitness than any other "mutant" strategy. Alger and Weibull
(2013) generalize this definition of evolutionary stability, applying it to preference evolution, in order
to identify an evolutionarily stable preference. This approach led to the emergence of a homo moralis
type of preference. However, assuming the presence of only one homogeneous resident preference,
their approach overlooks the empirically observed heterogeneity of preferences among individuals.
Our aim is to fill this gap.
We conduct our analysis in the context of strategic interactions between pairwise-matched indi-
viduals of a large population. We consider a fitness game which applies to symmetric interactions and
asymmetric interactions with ex-ante symmetry. In other words, each individual is as likely to be in
one or the other side of the interaction. As Güth and Yaari (1992), we adopt an indirect evolutionary
framework: the behavior of individuals, i.e. the strategy they play, is driven by the maximization of
(subjective) personal preferences, while their evolutionary success is given by some exogenous payoff
(fitness) function. To prevent individuals from deviating from their utility-maximization, we consider
the individuals’ preferences as their private information.3 We assume that there are several types, i.e.
several preferences, in the population. Each preference is described by a utility function. As in Alger
and Weibull (2013), the only restriction we impose on the set of preferences studied is the continuity
1Kant (1870) first formulation of his categorical imperative is: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can,
at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.”.
2Bergstrom (1995) also showed the evolutionary stability of a "semi-Kantian" utility function (a homo moralis with
morality coefficient one half) in the special case of symmetric interactions between siblings.
3A large body of research has studied preferences evolution under complete and incomplete information, showing
that individuals adjust their behavior under complete information (e.g. Robson, 1990; Ellingsen, 1997; Bester and Güth,
1998; Possajennikov, 2000; Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001; Sethi and Somanathan, 2001; Heifetz et al., 2007; Dekel et al.,
2007). For example, suppose that two individuals are playing a prisoner’s dilemma, where the first player prefers to
defect and the second prefers to cooperate. Under incomplete information, each individual will stick to their original
preference. But if the cooperator knows the preference of the defector, then she will deviate and also defect (See also
Ockenfels, 1993, for a discussion of cooperation in prisoners’ dilemma).
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of the associated utility function.
A key feature of the model lies in the matching process. Building on Bergstrom (2003), we consider
that the meeting probability between two individuals follows an exogenous assortative matching
process rather than the more classical uniform random matching. This assortative matching makes it
more likely for a given individual to meet an individual of her same type. This tendency of individuals
to interact more between similar others has been a subject of interest for economics, sociology and
biology scholars often called homophily (McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009; Golub and
Jackson, 2012). To precisely model this homophily, we generalize the assortment function suggested
by Bergstrom (2003) introducing a novel, type-by-type assortment functions matrix allowing for
calibration of the bilateral degree of homophily among each potential couple of matched individual.
In this theoretical setting, we investigate the conditions under which two resident types could
co-exist and resist the invasion of any mutant. To do so, we generalize the definition of evolutionarily
stable preference (Alger and Weibull, 2013) by proposing the concept of evolutionarily stable popula-
tion. When a population is made of a unique resident and a mutant, our definition is consistent with
the classical setting.
After discussing the conditions for cohabitation of two resident types in a population, we prove the
existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in symmetric 2× 2 fitness games in the
special case of a uniformly-constant assortment. We also characterize the conditions for this existence.
However, not all games welcome a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population playing diverse
strategies: in some games all individuals should play the same strategy (heterogeneity in preferences
but not in strategies). Somewhat surprisingly, we find a link between the strategies played by the two
types of an evolutionarily stable population, and the strategies played by an evolutionarily stable homo
moralis in the framework of Alger and Weibull (2013). Finally, we show that the evolutionarily stable
preferences in a heterogeneous population are context-dependent. As an illustration, we display the
conditions under which a population made of two kinds of homo moralis, the selfish homo oeconomicus,
and the fully-moral homo kantiensis, can coexist and be evolutionarily stable in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Our work contributes to two major branches of the literature. First, the evolution of strategies
in a heterogeneous population has been extensively studied (mostly in biology) in the context of
evolutionary game dynamics.4 For example, Bergstrom (2003) and Allen and Nowak (2015) study
the evolution of cooperation under assortative matching in social dilemmas. Their results are in line
with ours when the cooperating individuals are represented by the moral homo kantiensis preference
and the defectors by the selfish homo oeconomicus preference. Second, as argued by Norton et al.
(1998), preferences evolve by selection acting on traits that are genetically and culturally transmit-
ted. Thus, economists have adapted the standard evolutionary game theory framework to study
the evolution of preferences (Güth and Yaari, 1992). In particular, Dekel et al. (2007) evaluate the
evolutionary stability of a distribution of preferences in a population and the associated equilibrium
(called a configuration) depending on the observability of preferences. Their definition of stable
configuration is close to our concept of evolutionarily stable population. Other authors have also an-
alyzed the dynamic evolution of preferences, with application to individualistic preferences (Ok and
Vega-Redondo, 2001), to social rewards (Fershtman and Weiss, 1998), to biases (Sandholm, 2001), to
negatively interdependent preferences (Koçkesen et al., 2000) or to overconfidence and interdependent
preferences (Heifetz et al., 2007). However, most of the literature on preference evolution assumes
a uniform random matching. Sethi and Somanathan (2001) provide an interesting discussion of the
4See for instance Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003), Sandholm (2010) and Nowak et al. (2010) for a description and
review of the field.
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evolutionary stability of selfish and reciprocal preferences (as defined by Levine, 1998) under both
assortative and non-assortative matching, but without explicitly modeling the assortative matching
process. Alger and Weibull (2013) introduce assortative matching but assume only one resident type
in the population. Hence, our model helps to bridge this gap in the literature.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we present the model and
extend the assortment function to a population of several types introducing the assortment matrix,
in Section 3 we discuss the conditions under which two types can coexist, in Section 4 we define an
evolutionarily stable population and study the case of uniformly-constant assortment, in Section 5 we
discuss our results and delve into the case of state-dependent assortment, and we conclude in Section
6.
2. Model and definitions
As in Alger and Weibull (2013), we consider a large population where individuals are randomly
matched into pairs to engage in a symmetric interaction with the common strategy set X. We assume
that X is a nonempty, compact and convex set. Individuals are utility maximizers, and their behavior
depends on their type θ ∈ Θ, i.e. their preferences which are described by a continuous utility function
uθ : X
2 → R. Individuals’ success in the game is determined by the resulting payoffs: an individual
who plays strategy x ∈ X when the opponent plays strategy y ∈ X gets material payoff pi(x, y),
where we assume pi : X2 → R to be continuous.
Before explaining in more details our model framework, we present in the following section the
classical setting of a population consisting of two types: one resident type and one mutant type. We
introduce some definitions and results useful for the rest of the paper.
2.1 Classical setting
We consider a population of two types θ, τ ∈ Θ. The two types and their respective shares define
a population state s = (θ, τ, ε), where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the population share of τ . If ε is small, we call θ
the resident type and τ the mutant type.5
The matching process is random and exogenous6, and it may be assortative. Let pτ |θ(ε) be the
conditional probability that an individual being of type θ is matched with an individual of type
τ in the population state s = (θ, τ, ε).7 Similarly, pθ|θ(ε) is the probability for an individual to
be matched with an individual of type θ, conditional on being of type θ. We can then define the
assortment function and assortativity:
Definition 1 (Assortment function and assortativity). In a population state s = (θ, τ, ε) with
 ∈ (0, 1), let φ(ε) be the difference between the probability for an individual to be matched with an
individual of type θ, conditional on being of type θ herself, and the probability for an individual to
be matched with an individual of type θ, conditional on being of type τ .
In other words, we have: φ(ε) = pθ|θ(ε)−pθ|τ (ε), defining an assortment function φ : (0, 1)→ [−1, 1].
5By extension, we will sometimes talk about residents (mutants) to refer to the individuals of the resident (mutant)
type.
6Allowing individuals to select their partners (Becker, 1973, 1974a; Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2010; Jackson and Watts,
2010) would require to include informational and strategic features beyond the scope of this study.
7This probability is noted Pr[θ|τ, ε] in Alger and Weibull (2013).
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Assuming φ is continuous and converges as ε tends to zero, the assortativity σ ∈ [0, 1] is the limit of
φ in zero: limε→0 φ(ε) = σ
The assortment function models the homophily between two types. Homophily is the tendency
of individuals to interact more with others with similar characteristics such as family, ethnicity, age,
gender, language, religion, geographic proximity, education, work, association activity or income
(Ibarra, 1993; McPherson et al., 2001).
Individuals choose their strategy in order to maximize their utility. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) is a pair of strategies, one for each type, where each strategy is a best reply to the other in
the given population state:
Definition 2 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). In any state s = (θ, τ, ε), a strategy pair (x∗, y∗) ∈
X2 is a type-homogeneous Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
pθ|θ(ε) · uθ(x, x∗) + pτ |θ(ε) · uθ(x, y∗)
y∗ ∈ argmax
y∈X
pθ|τ (ε) · uτ (y, x∗) + pτ |τ (ε) · uτ (y, y∗)
The set of Bayesian Nash Equilibria in population state s = (θ, τ, ε), i.e. all solutions (x∗, y∗), is
called BNE(s) ⊆ X2.
Let Πθ(x, y, ε) be the average payoff obtained by individuals of type θ when they play x ∈ X
and when individuals of type τ play y ∈ X. Similarly, Πτ (x, y, ε) is the average payoff obtained by
individuals of type τ . We can express the average payoffs obtained by individuals of type θ and τ in
function of the game payoffs:{
Πθ(x, y, ε) = pθ|θ(ε) · pi(x, x) + pτ |θ(ε) · pi(x, y)
Πτ (x, y, ε) = pθ|τ (ε) · pi(y, x) + pτ |τ (ε) · pi(y, y) (1)
Now consider a population of residents with type θ. What happens when a small group of mutants
of type τ "invade" the population? If the residents earn a greater payoff than the mutants, then the
resident type θ can withstand a small-scale invasion of the type τ , and type θ is called evolutionarily
stable against type τ .
Definition 3 (Evolutionarily stable preference). A type θ ∈ Θ is evolutionarily stable against a
type τ ∈ Θ if there exists an ε¯ > 0 such that Πθ(x∗, y∗, ε) > Πτ (x∗, y∗, ε) in all Nash equilibria (x∗, y∗)
in all states s = (θ, τ, ε) with ε ∈ (0, ε¯). A type θ ∈ Θ is evolutionarily stable if it is evolutionarily
stable against all types τ 6= θ ∈ Θ.
In this setting, Alger and Weibull (2013) show that the only evolutionarily stable preference is the
one of homo hamiltonensis, a particular kind of homo moralis.
Definition 4 (Homo moralis and homo hamiltonensis). An individual is a homo moralis if her
utility function is of the form:
uκ(x, y) = (1− κ) · pi(x, y) + κ · pi(x, x) (2)
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where κ ∈ [0, 1] is her degree of morality.
A homo moralis maximizes a convex combination of her classical selfish payoff, with a weight (1−κ),
and of her "moral" payoff, defined as the payoff she would get if her opponent plays like her, with
a weight κ. If κ = 0, then the individual is a homo oeconomicus (fully selfish). If κ = 1, then the
individual is a homo kantiensis (fully moral). If the degree of morality κ is equal to the assortativity
σ, then the individual is called homo hamiltonensis8.
Definition 5 (Hamiltonian strategies). Hamiltonian strategies xσ ∈ X are the strategies played
by homo hamiltonensis individuals when all residents are of this type. Formally:
xσ ∈ argmax
x∈X
uσ(x, xσ)
For all y ∈ X, we call βσ(y) = argmaxx∈X uσ(x, y) the best-reply correspondence of homo hamil-
tonensis individuals, and we denote by Xσ = {x ∈ X : x ∈ βσ(x)} the set of fixed-points of homo
hamiltonensis.
Consider a population of homo hamiltonensis and a small group of mutants that wish to enter the
population. If the mutant type is not a "behavioral-alike"9 to homo hamiltonensis, the individuals
with the mutant type will always get a lower payoff than the homo hamiltonensis individuals. For
example, if the mutant is a homo moralis with a degree of morality different from the assortativity
(κ 6= σ), such that this homo moralis and homo hamiltonensis are not behaviorally-alike, then to
enter the population, the degree of morality of the homo moralis should evolve in direction of the
assortativity.
In Alger and Weibull (2013), the residents all have the same type. But is this a required feature of
the population? What happens when the population is more diverse? Is it possible to have a stable
population comprised of residents with several types? We explore these questions in this paper.
2.2 A Population with n resident types
We expand the previous model by allowing for the presence of more than one resident type. In
this adjusted setting, the population comprises individuals of n resident types (θ1, θ2,..., θn) and
one mutant type θτ . If n > 1, i.e. if there are at least two resident types in the population, the
population is called heterogeneous. The (n+ 1) types and their respective shares define a population
state s = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, λ2, ..., λn, ε), where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the population share of θτ and for all i
∈ J1 ..nK, λi ∈ (0, 1) is the share of the residents of type θi. Thus, the population share of θ1 is λ1,
the population share of θ2 is λ2 and so on. We have:
n∑
i=1
λi = 1− ε (3)
8Alger and Weibull (2013) named homo hamiltonensis in homage to the late biologist William Donald Hamilton.
See Grafen (2004) for a biography.
9Types θ and τ are called behavioral-alike if they are behaviorally indistinguishable. Precisely, with θ being the
resident, the set of of types τ that are behaviorally alike to θ is called Θθ:
Θθ = {τ ∈ Θ : ∃x ∈ Xθ s.t. (x, x) ∈ BNE(θ, τ, 0)}
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Therefore, s could be described with only n population shares instead of all of them. For example
in the classical setting, s = (θ, τ, ε). In the case of two residents and one mutant, we will often
use s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, ε) with λ the relative share of θ2 with respect to θ1, i.e. λ2 = λ(1 − ε) and
λ1 = (1− λ)(1− ε).
For the sake of tractability, we introduce a new notation. For all (i, j) ∈ J1 ..nK2, the conditional
probability that an individual being of type θi is matched with an individual of type θj is called pji.10
In particular, for all i ∈ J1 ..nK we note pii the conditional probability that an individual being of
type θi is matched with an individual of the same type θi. For mutants of type θτ , for all i ∈ J1..nK
we note pτi the conditional probability that an individual being of type θi is matched with a mutant
and piτ the conditional probability that a mutant is matched with an individual of type θi. Moreover,
for all i ∈ J1 ..nK, we note ui the utility of residents of type θi and uτ the utility of mutants.
Extending the concept of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium seen above to the case of (n + 1) types of
individuals (θ1, θ2, ..., θn, θτ ), we have:
Definition 6 (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium). In a population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε),
(x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ ) ∈ Xn+1 is a type-homogeneous Bayesian Nash equilibrium if:
∀i ∈ J1 ..nK : xi ∈ argmax
x∈X
n∑
j=1
(pji · ui(x, xj)) + pτi · ui(x, xτ )
xτ ∈ argmax
x∈X
n∑
j=1
(pjτ · uτ (xj)) + pττ · uτ (x, xτ )
(4)
Assortative matching
The matching process is still random and exogenous. In the following, we first present some
conditions that the matching process should satisfy to be well defined. Then, building on Bergstrom
(2003), we introduce a novel, type-by-type assortment matrix function allowing for assortative match-
ing in interactions between individuals of (n+ 1) distinct types: the n resident type and the mutant
type.
Let I = (J1..nK ∪ {τ}). The conditional probabilities pij should satisfy the following matching
conditions:
∀ i ∈ I :
∑
j∈I
pji = 1 (5)
Matching conditions ensure that each individual is matched with another individual with proba-
bility one, i.e. nobody is left behind without a match.
The conditional probabilities should also satisfy the balancing conditions:
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2 : λj · pij = λi · pji (6)
Balancing conditions ensure the coherence of the matching process. They stipulate that the
probability of the event "being of type θi and being matched with an individual of type θj" is the
same as the probability of the event "being of type θj and being matched with an individual of type
10Note that all these probabilities are a function of the population state s but we drop this precision for readability
purposes.
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θi".
Now we are in position to generalize the notion of assortment function and assortativity for a
population made of more than two types.
Definition 7 (Assortment matrix). In a population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε), for all
(i, j) ∈ I2, let φij(λ1, ..., λn, ε) be the difference between the conditional probability to be matched
with type θi, given that the individual herself is of type θi, and the probability to be matched with
type θi, given that the individual is of type θj : φij(λ1, ..., λn, ε) = pii − pij .
For all (i, j) ∈ I2, φij : (0, 1)n+1 → [−1, 1].11 This defines an exogenous assortment functions matrix:
Φ = ((φij(λ1, ..., λn, ε)))(i,j)∈I2
Extending the concept of assortment function, the assortment matrix embeds homophily effects,
relating to the notion of distance in network economics (Currarini et al., 2009; Iijima and Kamada,
2017). Along the concept of homophily, this matrix allows accounting for the higher probability of in-
teracting with similar others (Byrne, 1971; Lakin and Chartrand, 2003). Some alternative approaches
to model homophily in an evolutionary framework include evolutionary graph theory and evolution-
ary set theory (Nowak et al., 2010). In the former, individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and
their interactions are governed by edges (Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2008; Shakarian
et al., 2012). In the latter, individuals belong to several sets (e.g. school, company, living location,
associations, etc.) and the more sets they have in common, the more interactions between them
(Tarnita et al., 2009). The assortment matrix defined above is exogenous and hence allows for large
flexibility in the setting of the assortment as a function of the state s. It can therefore be used in a
variety of contexts like economics, sociology, biology or management, with the possibility to calibrate
its values empirically.
We now introduce a particular type of assortment matrix extending the classical case of constant
assortment often used in single-resident populations (Alger and Weibull, 2012; Salmon and Wilson,
2013) derived from the Wright’s coefficient of relatedness in biology (Wright, 1922). This definition
will be useful in the evolutionary stability analysis.
Definition 8 (Uniformly constant assortment matrix). An assortment matrix Φ is called uni-
formly constant when all of its non-diagonal components are independent of the population shares
and equal to the same value.12 In other words, we will say that Φ is uniformly constant13 when, for
all (i, j, k, l) ∈ I4 such that i 6= j and k 6= l:{
φij : (0, 1)
n+1 → [−1, 1] is constant,
φij(·) = φkl(·) (7)
Note that the classical case of uniform random matching, where the matching process is not
assortative, is a special case of uniformly-constant assortment where each assortment function is
constant and equal to zero: Φ = ((0))(i,j)∈I2 .
11The assortment functions actually depend on n variables instead of n+ 1 because the sum of the population shares
is equal to one. For instance, in the classical setting, the assortment function can be defined only in function of the
population share of the mutant.
12By definition of the assortment functions, the matrix Φ has a diagonal of zeros.
13By extension, we will say that the assortment is uniformly constant when the assortment matrix is uniformly
constant.
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Following Alger and Weibull (2013), we assume that for all (i, j) ∈ I2, φij(·) is continuous in ε
(the share of mutants in the population) and converges as ε tends to zero.14 We call assortativity
σ ∈ [0, 1] the limit for all i ∈ J1 ..nK of φτi when ε tends to zero:15
∀ i ∈ J1..nK : lim
ε→0
φτi(λ1, ..., λn, ε) = σ (8)
The continuity of the assortment functions and the definition of assortativity σ ∈ [0, 1] imply that
any uniformly-constant assortment matrix can be written as a function of the unit-matrix J16 and
the identity matrix I as follows:
Φ = σ(J − I) (9)
Matching probabilities
In the following, we will use the notation φij to designate φij(λ1, ..., λn, ε), abstracting from
the arguments of the assortment functions for simplicity. The above definition of assortment gives
assortment conditions on the conditional probabilities pij :
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2 : φij = pii − pij (10)
Knowing the assortment matrix Φ, we have a system of equations defined by matching conditions
(5), balancing conditions (6) and assortment conditions (10). The system has a (unique) solution
when the exogenous assortment matrix verifies some conditions that we call the assortment balancing
conditions:17
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2 : λj ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφik
)
− φij
]
= λi ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφjk
)
− φji
]
(11)
The assortment balancing conditions ensure the coherence of the assortative matching. In the case
of two types in the population, the conditions boil down to one equivalence condition: φ12(λ1, λ2) =
φ21(λ1, λ2). More details are available in AppendixA.
When the assortment matrix satisfies the assortment balancing conditions, we can express the
conditional probabilities in function of the population shares and assortment functions:
Proposition 1 (Matching probabilities). When the assortment matrix Φ satisfies the assortment
balancing conditions (11), the system defined by matching conditions (5), balancing conditions (6)
and assortment conditions (10) has a unique solution:
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 : pij = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij (12)
Proof. In AppendixC.1
14Note that the residents population shares (λi)i∈(0,1)n change as ε tends to zero, and are hence not the same as in
the original population state s = (θ1, θ2, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, λ2, ..., λn, ε).
15At the limit when ε goes to zero, we have for all i ∈ J1 ..nK, φτi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn, 0)=pττ . Indeed, according to the
balancing conditions, the probability of a resident to be matched with a mutant pτi is zero. Thus, the assortativity is
independent of the resident types, and we have σ ∈ [0, 1].
16The unit-matrix J is the matrix having each of its components equal to one.
17For convenience, we call λτ the population share of mutant, i.e. λτ = ε.
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Note that under uniform random matching, for all (i, j) ∈ I2 φji = 0 and we obtain pij = λi,
i.e. each individual is matched with an individual of type θi according to the population share λi of
individuals of type θi. It is also interesting to detail the conditional probabilities pii:
∀ i ∈ I : pii = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik (13)
The conditional probabilities pii are the sum of several terms. The first, λi, is the population share
of individuals of type θi. The others, λkφik, represent the additional matching between individual of
type θi at the expense of matching with individuals of type θk, weighted by λk the population share
of individuals of type θk.
The conditional probabilities for the case of two residents and one mutant are detailed in Ap-
pendixB.
We now derive a useful result for our analysis of evolutionary stability (section 4). Let BNE(s) ⊆
Xn+1 denote the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria in population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε), i.e.
all solutions (x1, ..., xn, xτ ) of (4). This defines an equilibrium correspondence BNE(θ1, ..., θn, θτ , ·) :
(0, 1)n+1 ⇒ Xn+1. This correspondence maps the population share of each type to the associated
equilibria. Using the above definition of assortativity, it can be extended by continuity to (0, 1)n×[0, 1)
to cover the limit when the mutant share ε goes to zero. The following lemma is an generalization to
the case of two types in Alger and Weibull (2013):
Lemma 1. BNE(s) is compact for each s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) ∈ Θn+1 × (0, 1)n × [0, 1).
BNE(s) 6= ∅ if for all i ∈ I ui are concave in their first arguments.
The correspondence BNE(θ1, ..., θn, θτ , ·) : (0, 1)n × [0, 1)⇒ Xn+1 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof. In AppendixC.2.
3. Cohabitation of two residents
The core contribution of this paper consists of the consideration of the cohabitation of more than
one resident type in the population. What happens then? If one type dominates the other, i.e. if
individuals of type θ1 get a higher payoff than individuals of type θ2, it seems unlikely that θ2 would
survive. In evolutionary game dynamics, the evolution of strategies (and preferences) is dictated
by what is called a replicator, and depends on the difference between each payoff obtained and the
average payoff in the population. If the payoff of a given type is greater than the average payoff, then
the population share of this type will increase. Thus, the two types should get the same payoff to
coexist without one overcoming (or invading) one another. We call this condition Payoff Equality.
The Payoff Equality condition is similar to the concept of balanced configuration by Dekel et al.
(2007). A configuration is a distribution of preferences in a population and the associated equilibrium.
It is balanced when all types present receive the same fitness, i.e. the same payoff. In our case, the
distribution of preferences is simply defined by the population share of each type. In the following
section, we evaluate the conditions under which the Payoff Equality condition is satisfied.
3.1 Payoff Equality condition
Let’s assume (x1, x2) ∈ X2 is a BNE in the population state s = (θ1, θ2, λ), with λ ∈ (0, 1) the
share of θ2. Noting Π1 the average payoff of individuals θ1 and Π2 the average payoff of individuals
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θ2, the Payoff Equality condition is met when:
Π1(x
1, x2, λ) = Π2(x
1, x2, λ) (14)
We can write the payoffs of θ1 and θ2 (Equation (1)) using the matching probabilities derived in
(12)18 and the notations piij = pi(xi, xj):19
Π1(x
1, x2, λ) = ((1− λ) + λ · φ12) · pi11 + λ(1− φ12) · pi12
Π2(x
1, x2, λ) = (1− λ)(1− φ21) · pi21 + (λ+ (1− λ)φ21) · pi22 (15)
Under what conditions on the payoffs (pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22) and on λ ∈ (0, 1) are total payoffs equal?
Since we are in the context of only two residents, the assortment balancing condition (11) implies
that φ12 = φ21. We can then equate the expressions of the payoff functions of θ1 and θ2 (equation
(15)), which gives, after rearranging, the following condition:
λ(1− φ12)(pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) = pi11 − pi21 − φ12(pi22 − pi21)
This equation can also be rewritten by reordering the terms to put forward the share of θ1 in the
population (1− λ), as follows:
(1− λ)(1− φ12)(pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) = pi22 − pi12 − φ12(pi11 − pi12)
We define:
Qpi = pi
11 − pi21 − φ12(pi22 − pi21)
Rpi = pi
22 − pi12 − φ12(pi11 − pi12)
Spi = pi
11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21
(16)
Note that we have: Qpi +Rpi = (1− φ12)Spi.
We can rewrite the Payoff Equality condition to obtain two equivalent equations, one for λ and
the other for (1− λ):
λ(1− φ12)Spi = Qpi (17)
(1− λ)(1− φ12)Spi = Rpi (18)
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Payoff Equality). Let (x1, x2) ∈ X2 be a BNE in the population state s = (θ1, θ2, λ),
with λ ∈ (0, 1). The Payoff Equality condition Π1(x1, x2, λ) = Π2(x1, x2, λ) is satisfied if and only if:
1. Qpi = 0 and Spi = 0, or
2. Qpi 6= 0 and Rpi 6= 0 are of the same sign, and λ(1− φ12) = Qpi/Spi, or
3. Qpi = 0, Rpi = 0, Spi 6= 0 and φ12 = 1.
Note that for all other possible cases, Payoff Equality is not satisfied.
18The matching probabilities with only two residents are detailed in the Appendix, Equation (B.2)
19Remember that the assortment functions depend on the population share λ, i.e. φ12 = φ12(λ) and φ21 = φ21(λ)
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Proof. In AppendixC.3
Here are a few examples for each case of the proposition:
1. (a) If pi12 = pi11 = pi22 = pi21. For example, if x1 = x2 then all individuals play the same
strategy. No matter the share of each type, they will get the same payoff.
(b) If pi11 = pi21, pi12 = pi22, and if φ12 = 0. All individuals obtain the same payoff when
playing against an individual of type θ1. They also obtain the same payoff when playing
against a θ2. Since there is no assortment, the matching probabilities are equal to the
population share, i.e. all individuals have the same probabilities (1− λ) to play against a
θ1 and λ to play against a θ2.
2. (a) If {pi11 = pi22, pi11 > pi12, pi11 > pi21} or if {pi11 = pi22, pi11 < pi12, pi11 < pi21}, and if
λ = (pi11 − pi21)/Spi and φ12 6= 1. This is an interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive
case because the assortment does not play a role in the equilibrium population share λ.
In the special case where pi12 = pi21, then λ should be equal to 0.5.
(b) If {pi12 = pi21 = pi11 6= pi22} or if {pi11 6= pi22 = pi12 = pi21}, and if λ = −φ12/(1− φ12). In
this case, the equilibrium population share does not depend on the payoffs. Note also that
the assortment should be negative, φ12 < 0, i.e. we are in a situation of heterophily.20
3. An assortment equal to 1 means that individuals θ1 only meet individuals θ1, getting pi11, while
individuals θ2 only meet individuals θ2, getting pi22. If Qpi = 0, Rpi = 0 and φ12 = 1, then
pi11 = pi22 and all individuals get the same payoff.
4. If pi11 and pi12 are strictly greater than pi21 and pi22, then there is no λ that satisfies Payoff
Equality. No matter the population share, individuals θ1 will always get more than individuals
θ2.
In any fitness game, Proposition 2 enables to determine if two strategies could be played or not
by individuals of a heterogeneous population that satisfies Payoff Equality, just by computing Qpi,
Rpi and Spi.
In the standard framework of evolutionary game dynamics, the game is finite and individuals play
pure strategies. At the equilibrium, the remaining strategies in the population should respect the
Payoff Equality. Thus, Proposition 2 allows to quickly select or eliminate candidate strategies for an
equilibrium in a population of two types. The remaining question in this context is then whether or
not this equilibrium can be reached. The answer depends not only on the replicator but also on the
shape of the assortment function.
3.2 Cohabitation of two residents under uniformly-constant assortment
Having established the conditions for equality of the payoffs among two resident types in the
population, we now consider the case of a uniformly-constant assortment matrix (cf. Definition 8),
which is an extension of uniform random matching accounting for assortatively matched interactions.
We show that Hamiltonian strategies (cf. Definition 5) play a key role in this context.
20See for instance Harrigan and Yap (2017) for a discussion of negative ties in networks.
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We recall that BNE(s) is the set of solutions of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium problem (Definition
6), with s = (θ1, θ2, λ) the population state. Since we assume that the assortment function φ12 is
constant, it is equal to the assortativity by continuity (cf. (9)): for all λ ∈ (0, 1), φ12(λ) = σ ∈ [0, 1].
The following theorem proves that if individuals of a heterogeneous population play Hamiltonian
strategies, then the Payoff Equality is satisfied.
Theorem 1 (Payoff Equality and Hamiltonian strategies). When the assortment function φ12 is
constant, let s = (θ1, θ2, λ) be a population where θ1 individuals play x1 , θ2 individuals play x2, such
that (x1, x2) ∈ BNE(s) ⊂ X2σ, and λ = Qpi/(1− σ)Spi the share of θ2 in the population.
If βσ(x) is a singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality
condition.
Proof. First, if x1 = x2 then all individuals play the same strategy and earn the same payoff. Now
suppose that x1 6= x2. Since θ1 plays x1 ∈ Xσ, θ2 plays x2 ∈ Xσ with x1 6= x2, and βσ(x) is a
singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, we have:
x1 ∈ argmax
x∈X
uσ(x, x
1) ⇒ ∀x 6= x1 ∈ X, pi(x1, x1) > (1− σ) · pi(x, x1) + σ · pi(x, x)
x2 ∈ argmax
y∈X
uσ(y, x
2) ⇒ ∀y 6= x2 ∈ X, pi(x2, x2) > (1− σ) · pi(y, x2) + σ · pi(y, y)
In particular, for x = x2 and y = x1, we have:{
pi11 > (1− σ) · pi21 + σ · pi22 ⇒ Qpi > 0
pi22 > (1− σ) · pi12 + σ · pi11 ⇒ Rpi > 0
Consequently, since λ = Qpi/((1 − σ)Spi) by assumption, we are in case 2. of Proposition 2 and the
Payoff Equality condition is satisfied.
3.3 Some examples on finite games
We now look at several examples in two-strategies games to illustrate the Payoff Equality condi-
tion. We use the notation defined above piij = pi(xi, xj) to describe the payoff obtained by a player
playing xi when her opponent plays xj . Moreover, we denote by piij the payoff when pure strategy
i is played against pure strategy j. Also, we study in the following examples the case of a constant
assortment function: for all λ ∈ (0, 1), φ12(λ) = σ.
Coordination game
In the coordination game, players get reward only if they play the same strategy (i.e piAA > 0,
piBB > 0 and piAB = piBA = 0). Suppose that individuals θ1 are committed to strategy A while
individuals θ2 are committed to strategy B. Examples of such preferences include uθ1(x, y) = −(x−
xA)
2 and uθ2(x, y) = −(x− xB)2 where xA and xB denotes strategies A and B. When an individual
θ1 is matched with another individual of the same type θ1, she gets the payoff piAA = piAA, and
when she is matched with an individual θ2, she gets piAB = piAB = 0. Thus, Spi = piAA + piBB > 0,
Qpi = piAA − σpiBB and Rpi = piBB − σpiAA.
If piAA = piBB, then there are two possibilities to satisfy Payoff Equality. First, if σ = 1, for any
population share λ ∈ (0, 1), individuals only play against similar others, earning piAA = piBB (we are
then in case 3. of Proposition 2). Second, if σ < 1 and λ = (piAA − σpiBB)/[(1 − σ)(piAA + piBB)],
13
we are in case 2. of Proposition 2. For instance under uniform random matching, σ = 0, and with
λ = 1/2 all individuals earn piAA/2 = piBB/2 playing half of the time against similar others.
If piAA > piBB, then there exists a heterogeneous population that satisfies Payoff Equality only
if σ < piBB/piAA, and λ = (piAA − σpiBB)/[(1 − σ)(piAA + piBB)] (case 2. of Proposition 2). If
σ ≥ piBB/piAA, then individuals θ1 always earn more than individuals θ2.
Reciprocally, if piAA < piBB, then there exists a heterogeneous population that satisfies Payoff
Equality only if σ < piAA/piBB and λ = (piAA − σpiBB)/[(1− σ)(piAA + piBB)] (case 2. of Proposition
2).
Table 1: Coordination game example
A B
A (2, 2) (0, 0)
B (0, 0) (1, 1)
For example, let piAA = 2 and piBB = 1. A heterogeneous population satisfies Payoff Equality
when σ < 0.5 and λ = (2 − σ)/[3(1 − σ)]. When σ ≥ 0.5, individuals θ1 always earn more than
individuals θ2. With σ = 0.2, λ = 0.75, and individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same total payoff Π = 0.8.
Under uniform random matching, σ = 0, we get the classical mixed Nash equilibrium with λ = 2/3.
The results are illustrated in Figure 1.
0.5
−1
1
2
2/3 0.75 10 λ
Π1 −Π2
σ = 0
σ = 0.2
σ = 0.5
(a) Payoff difference
1
1
0
2/3
0.2
0.75
λ = Qpi/((1− σ)Spi)
0.5 σ
λ
(b) λ satisfying PE as a function of σ
Figure 1: Payoff Equality (PE) in a coordination game between individuals θ1 playing A and individuals θ2 playing
B (with λ the share of θ2).
Prisoner’s dilemma
In the prisoner’s dilemma, players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D), getting piCD < piDD <
piCC < piDC . Suppose a population of homo kantiensis (θ1, playing C) and homo oeconomicus (θ2,
playing D). We consider three different examples: (a) Spi < 0, (b) Spi = 0 and (c) Spi > 0.
Table 2: Prisoner’s dilemma examples
(a)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 6)
D (6, 0) (1, 1)
(b)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
(c)
C D
C (4, 4) (0, 4.5)
D (4.5, 0) (1, 1)
(a) First, let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 6. We then have Spi = −1 < 0,
Qpi = −2 + 5σ and Rpi = 1 − 4σ. Thus, there exists a heterogeneous population satisfying Payoff
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Equality when 0.25 < σ < 0.4 (see Figure 2a). With σ = 1/3, then λ = 0.5 and homo kantiensis
and homo oeconomicus co-exist and get the same payoff equal to Π = 8/3. If the assortment is too
low (e.g. under uniform random matching), only homo oeconomicus survives. In contrast, when the
assortment is too high (σ ≥ 0.4), homo kantiensis would dominate.
(b) Now let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 5. We have Spi = 0, Qpi = −1 + 4σ and
Rpi = 1−4σ. Thus, the only assortment value consistent with Payoff Equality is σ = 0.25 (see Figure
2b). But then, for any population share λ, homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus earn the same
payoff.
(c) Finally, let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 4.5. We have Spi = 0.5 > 0, Qpi =
−0.5 + 3.5σ and Rpi = 1 − 4σ. Thus, there exists a heterogeneous population satisfying Payoff
Equality when 1/7 < σ < 0.25 (see Figure 2c). For example, when σ = 0.2, then λ = 0.5 and homo
kantiensis and homo oeconomicus live together and get the same payoff equal to Π = 2.4. As above,
the assortment plays a key role: if too low or too high, one type will predominate.
1
−1
1
0.50 λ
Π1 −Π2
σ = 0.25
σ = 1/3
σ = 0.4
(a) piCC = 4, piCD = 0,
piDC = 6, piDD = 1
1
−1
1
0 λ
Π1 −Π2
σ = 0
σ = 0.25
σ = 0.5
(b) piCC = 4, piCD = 0,
piDC = 5, piDD = 1
1
−1
1
0.50 λ
Π1 −Π2
σ = 1/7
σ = 0.2
σ = 0.25
(c) piCC = 4, piCD = 0,
piDC = 4.5, piDD = 1
Figure 2: Payoff difference in prisoner’s dilemma between homo kantiensis (Π1) and homo oeconomicus (Π2)
Bergstrom (2003) and Allen and Nowak (2015) study the evolution of cooperative strategy under
assortative matching in social dilemmas in an evolutionary game dynamics framework. Since at
equilibrium strategies must respect the Payoff Equality, their results are consistent with ours. Allen
and Nowak (2015) investigate a game between relatives (with constant assortment), finding that
assortment favors cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma. In a simplified version of the game, where
payoffs (piCD = −c, piDD = 0, piCC = b − c and piDC = b with b > c > 0), they highlight that
cooperation is favored when a condition similar to the Hamilton’s rule is satisfied.21 We obtain an
analogous condition in this simplified game. Cooperation will outperform defection when bσ > c
(Case (b) of the example, i.e. Spi = 0). This condition is also derived by Bergstrom (2003) in
prisoner’s dilemma games with additive payoffs (Spi = 0).
4. Evolutionary stability
After having assessed the conditions under which individuals of two types can coexist in a popula-
tion in Section 3, we study the evolutionary stability of this heterogeneous population against mutant
invasions.
21Hamilton’s rule stipulates that the frequency of an altruistic gene will increase if br > c, with b the reproductive gain
for the recipient of the altruistic act, c the reproductive cost for the altruist individual, and r the genetic relatedness
of the recipient to the actor (Hamilton, 1964b,a).
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4.1 Evolutionarily stable population
We extend the concept of evolutionarily stable preference (Alger and Weibull, 2013) introducing
heterogeneity in resident individuals. An evolutionarily stable population should respect two condi-
tions. First, all types should earn the same payoff to coexist, i.e. they satisfy the Payoff Equality
condition (cf. (14)). Second, the population must resist the invasion of any other type, i.e. resident
individuals earn a greater payoff than a small group of mutants. Formally:
Definition 9 (Evolutionarily stable population). A population made of n resident types s =
(θ1, ..., θn, λ
◦
1, ..., λ
◦
n) is evolutionarily stable against a mutant type θτ ∈ Θ such that for all i ∈ J1 ..nK
θτ 6= θi if:
1. Resident individuals earn the same payoff when there is no mutant: for all (i, j) ∈ J1 ..nK2,
Πi(x
1, ..., xn, λ◦1, ..., λ◦n) = Πj(x1, ..., xn, λ◦1, ..., λ◦n) in all Bayesian Nash equilibria (x1, ..., xn) in
the population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, λ◦1, ..., λ◦n);
2. Resident individuals earn a greater payoff than a small share of mutants: there exists an ε¯ > 0
such that for all i ∈ J1 ..nK: Πi(x1, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) > Πτ (x1, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) in
all Bayesian Nash equilibria (x1, ..., xn, xτ ) in all states s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) with
ε ∈ (0, ε¯) and for all i ∈ J1 ..nK |λi − λ◦i | < ε¯.
Moreover, a population is evolutionarily stable if it is evolutionarily stable against all types θτ ∈ Θ
such that for all i ∈ J1 ..nK, θτ 6= θi.
This definition is similar to the concept of evolutionarily stable configuration by Dekel et al. (2007).
A configuration (a distribution of preference and the associated equilibria) is evolutionarily stable if it
is balanced, i.e. if all types earn the same payoff, and if mutants do not outperform residents. Thus, an
evolutionarily stable population can be understood as an evolutionarily stable configuration in which
the distribution of preferences is the shares of each type. However, there are a few differences between
the two definitions. First, the definition of evolutionarily stable population applies to preferences, and
thus to all Bayesian Nash equilibria of the population. Second, by requiring that the mutant type
is different from the residents in the definition of evolutionarily stable population, we can impose
that resident individuals earn a strictly greater payoff than the mutants. Finally, the introduction of
assortative matching limits the analysis to a finite number of types. In the following, we will focus
on the case of two resident types.
4.2 Evolutionary stability in finite game with uniformly-constant assortment
In this section, we consider the case of a uniformly-constant assortment matrix. Note that, by
continuity, all non-diagonal elements of the assortment matrix are equal to the assortativity. In other
words, for any population state s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, ε):22
∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, τ}2, i 6= j : φij = σ ∈ [0, 1]
We study finite symmetric 2× 2 fitness games. Let A be the matrix of the payoffs in this game,
with piij the payoff when pure strategy i is played against pure strategy j, i.e. A = ((piij))(i,j)∈{1,2}2 .
When players are permitted to used mixed strategies, the strategy set X is the segment ∆ = {z ∈
22λ is the relative share of θ2 with respect to θ1, i.e. λ1 = (1− λ)(1− ε) and λ2 = λ(1− ε).
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R2+ : z1 + z2 = 1}. The payoff obtained by an individual playing strategy x ∈ X = ∆ when matched
with an individual playing y ∈ X is then: pi(x, y) = xAy, where pi : X2 → R is a bilinear function.
We first introduce some lemmas that will be useful to derive our main results. Let (x1, x2, xτ ) ∈ X3
be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (cf. Definition 6) of the population s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, ε). Since we
are in a two-strategies game, we can express the strategy xτ in function of the strategies x1 and x2
when x1 6= x2. For this purpose, let α1, α2,∈ [0, 1] be the probabilities that θ1, θ2 individuals attach
to the first pure strategy: x1 = (α1, 1−α1) and x2 = (α2, 1−α2). Then, there exists γ ∈ R such that
xτ = γx1 + (1 − γ)x2 = (γα1 + (1 − γ)α2, 1 − γα1 − (1 − γ)α2).23 For instance, when the mutants
play like individuals θ1, γ = 1, and when they play like individuals θ2, γ = 0.
Suppose that the population s = (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality condition: Π1(x1, x2, λ) =
Π2(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ. When x1 6= x2, we can write the differences in payoff between the residents and
the mutant at the limit (when ε goes to zero):
Lemma 2 (Difference in payoffs). For a population s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, ε) engaged in a symmetric
2 × 2 fitness game such that the Payoff Equality condition is satisfied when s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0), the
difference in payoffs between the residents playing x1 6= x2 and the mutant θτ at the limit (when ε
goes to zero) is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21)
Proof. In AppendixC.4.
When studying the sign of this difference in payoffs, it is useful to understand what is the sign of
γ(1−γ). Without loss of generality and by symmetry we can assume α2 < α1, i.e. individuals θ1 play
the pure strategy 1 with a greater probability than individuals θ2. Let ατ be the probability that τ
attaches to pure strategy 1, ατ = γα1 + (1− γ)α2. If ατ ∈ (α2, α1), then γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ(1− γ) > 0.
If ατ = α1 or ατ = α2, then γ(1− γ) = 0. Else γ(1− γ) < 0 (see Fig. 3).
0 α2 ατ α1 1
γ(1− γ) > 0
0 α2 α1 ατ 1
γ(1− γ) < 0
Figure 3: Sign of γ(1− γ) depending on the probabilities attached to the first pure strategy
Finally, we also need to introduce one of the results of Alger and Weibull (2013). This result
describes the strategies played by homo hamiltonensis (and more generally by homo moralis) in
symmetric 2× 2 fitness game. We recall that Xσ is the set of fixed-points of homo hamiltonensis, i.e.
the strategies that homo hamiltonensis individuals play when they are alone in the population (called
Hamiltonian strategies). As we show below, there is a close link between Hamiltonian strategies, and
the strategies played by a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in the case of uniformly-
constant assortment.
Lemma 3 (Proposition 2 of Alger and Weibull (2013)). Let
xˆ(σ) = min
{
1,
pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22
(1 + σ)(pi12 + pi21 − pi11 − pi22)
}
23The only case when this decomposition does not exist is when α1 = α2.
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When σ > 0,
1. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 > 0, then Xσ ⊆ {0, 1}.
2. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 = 0, then
Xσ =

{0}, if pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 < 0
[0, 1] , if pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 = 0
{1}, if pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 > 0
3. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 < 0, then
Xσ =
{ {0}, if pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 ≤ 0
{xˆ(σ)}, if pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 > 0
We omit in what follows the case where σ = 0 (uniform random matching) to focus on the
situations with assortative matching (for an analysis of the random matching case see for instance
Dekel et al., 2007). Recall that BNE(s) is the set of solutions of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
problem (6), with s = (θ1, θ2, λ) the population state. The type set Θ is called rich if for each strategy
x ∈ X, there exists some type θ ∈ Θ for which this strategy is strictly dominant: uθ(x, y) > uθ(x′, y)
for all x′ 6= x and y in X. The following proposition details when two resident types cannot be part
of an evolutionarily stable population:
Proposition 3 (Non evolutionarily-stable population). In a symmetric 2× 2 fitness game where the
assortment matrix is uniformly constant and strictly positive, let s = (θ1, θ2, λ) be a heterogeneous
population.
If there exists (x1, x2) ∈ BNE(s) such that (x1, x2) /∈ X2σ and if Θ is rich, then the population is not
evolutionarily stable.
Proof. In AppendixC.5.
The proposition shows that if one resident does not play a Hamiltonian strategy when the type set
is rich in a symmetric 2× 2 fitness game under uniformly-constant and strictly positive assortment,
then the population is not evolutionarily stable.24
But what happens when the two residents play Hamiltonian strategies? Could this population be
evolutionarily stable? The answer is yes, when Xσ is a singleton and when Xσ = {0, 1}.25 Let Θ12
be the set of mutants τ that are behaviorally indistinguishable from residents θ1 and θ2:
Θ12 =
{
θτ ∈ Θ : ∃x ∈ X such that (x1, x, x) or (x, x2, x) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0)
}
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (Evolutionarily stable population). In a symmetric 2 × 2 fitness game where the as-
sortment matrix is uniformly constant and strictly positive, let s = (θ1, θ2, λ) be a heterogeneous
24The proof develops a stronger argument than "not evolutionarily stable". It shows that there exists a mutant type
such that the mutants earn a strictly greater payoff than the residents in all Bayesian Nash equilibria in a neighborhood
of the entry point. Alger and Weibull (2013) call this property evolutionary unstability.
25In the last possible case, Xσ = [0, 1], any strategy gives the same payoff meaning that there does not exist an
evolutionarily stable population, even for single-type population
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population.
If for all (x1, x2) ∈ BNE(s), (x1, x2) ∈ X2σ, if λ = Qpi/((1− σ)Spi), and if βσ(x) is a singleton for all
x ∈ Xσ, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) is evolutionarily stable against all types θτ /∈ Θ12.
Proof. We first show that the residents earn a strictly greater payoff than the mutants at the limit,
and then extend the result to a small neighborhood.
First note that if (x1, x2) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, λ), then the strategies x1 and x2 will also belong to the
set of Bayesian Nash equilibria for a population of three types when the mutant share is zero, i.e.
(x1, x2, xτ ) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0), where xτ is the strategy played by mutants τ .
If (x1, x2) ∈ X2σ such that x1 = x2 = xσ, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff
Equality condition when the mutant is absent. Moreover, since βσ(x) is a singleton for all x ∈ Xσ, we
have uσ(xσ, xσ) > uσ(x, xσ) for all x ∈ X such that x 6= xσ, i.e. pi(xσ, xσ) > (1−σ)pi(x, xσ)+σpi(x, x).
In particular when x = xτ (θτ /∈ Θ12), we have pi(xσ, xσ) > (1 − σ)pi(xτ , xσ) + σpi(xτ , xτ ). At
the limit when the mutant share goes to zero, we have: Π1 = Π2 = Πθ = pi(xσ, xσ) and Πτ =
(1− σ)pi(xτ , xσ) + σpi(xτ , xτ ) so that Πθ > Πτ .
If (x1, x2) ∈ X2σ such that x1 6= x2, then the population (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality
condition when the mutant is absent from Theorem 1 because λ = Qpi/((1 − σ)Spi) by assumption.
Then, from Lemma 2, we know that the difference in payoffs between the residents and mutants θτ
at the limit is:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21)
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 1, we have Qpi > 0 and Rpi > 0, and thus from Proposition 2, we
also have Spi > 0. Since Spi = (α1−α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) (C.6), we have pi11+pi22−pi12−pi21 > 0.
Thus, we are in case 1 of Lemma 3, and since (x1, x2) ∈ X2σ such that x1 6= x2, we know that
Xσ = {0, 1}. It means that individuals θ1 and θ2 play the two pure strategies. Without loss of
generality and by symmetry, we can assume that individuals θ1 play the pure strategy 1 (α1 = 1),
and that individuals θ2 play the pure strategy 2 (α2 = 0). Thus, γ is in fact the probability that θτ
attaches to the pure strategy 1. Moreover, since θτ /∈ Θ12, mutants cannot play a pure strategy and
γ ∈ (0, 1) i.e. γ(1− γ) > 0. We also have Spi = pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 > 0, and σ > 0. Consequently,
the difference in payoffs at the limit is strictly positive:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)Spi > 0
For both cases (x1 = x2 and x1 6= x2) We have shown:
Π1(x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) > Πτ (x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0)
and Π2(x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) > Πτ (x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0)
for all (x1, x2, xτ ) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0) and for any θτ /∈ Θ12. Moreover, Π1, Π2 and Πτ are
continuous by continuity of the game payoffs and of the assortment functions. Thus, the strict
inequalities hold for all (xˆ1, xˆ2, xˆτ ) in a neighborhood U ⊂ X3 × (0, 1) × [0, 1) of (x1, x2, xτ , λ, 0).
Using Lemma 1, we know that BNE(θ1, θ2, τ, ·) : (0, 1)× [0, 1)⇒ X3 is closed-valued and upper hemi-
continuous. If (x1t , x2t , xτt ) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λt, εt) for all t ∈ N, (λt, εt)→ (λ, 0) and
〈
(x1t , x
2
t , x
τ
t )
〉
t∈N
converges, then the limit point (x1∗, x2∗, xτ∗) necessarily belongs to BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0). Thus, for
any given ε¯ > 0, there exists a T such that, for all t > T , 0 < εt < ε¯ and (x1t , x2t , xτt , λt, εt) ∈ U , so
that Π1(x1t , x2t , xτt , λt, εt) > Πτ (x1t , x2t , xτt , λt, εt) and Π2(x1t , x2t , xτt , λt, εt) > Πτ (x1t , x2t , xτt , λt, εt).
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This theorem proves the existence of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in all sym-
metric 2 × 2 fitness games under uniformly-constant and strictly positive assortment as long as it
is possible to find two distinct types that are playing the same Hamiltonian strategy.26 However, a
heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population of two types playing diverse strategies is only possible
when Xσ = {0, 1}.
Even though the strategies played by two types of an evolutionarily stable population are Hamil-
tonian strategies, there are differences between a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population and
a population of homo hamiltonensis. We discuss these differences in section 5.1. Moreover, this link
with Hamiltonian strategies is only valid under uniformly-constant assortment matrix. We discuss
the non uniformly-constant assortment case in section 5.2. In the following section, we focus on the
case where two types play diverse strategies, studying the same examples as in section 3.3.
4.3 Some examples of finite games
In the following examples, we study the evolutionary stability of a heterogeneous population of
two types playing diverse strategies, under uniformly-constant assortment: for all (i, j) ∈ I2 such
that i 6= j and for all (λ, ) ∈ (0, 1)× [0, 1), φij(λ, ) = σ.
Coordination game
In the coordination game we considered in section 3.3, we had piAA = 2 and piBB = 1. For all
i ∈ {1, 2, τ}, let αi be the probability that individuals θ1, θ2 and τ attach to strategy A.
Let individuals θ1 be committed to strategy A (α1 = 1) and individuals θ2 to strategy B (α2 = 0).
We saw that it was possible to have Payoff Equality when σ < 0.5. For instance, for an assortment
σ = 0.2 and a population share λ = 0.75, individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same payoff equal to Πθ = 0.8.
Moreover, since the residents play the pure strategies, we have Spi = piAA + piBB = 3 > 0 and ατ = γ
(ατ = γα1 +(1−γ)α2). From Lemma 2, we know that the difference in payoffs between the residents
and the mutant at the limit is: Πθ−Πτ = σγ(1−γ)Spi > 0. As illustrated in Figure 4a, the difference
in payoffs is strictly positive for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, using similar arguments than in the proof
of Theorem 2, we can conclude that this population is evolutionarily stable.
However, if the residents do not play the pure strategies, then the population is not evolutionarily
stable. For instance, let α1 = 0.8 and α2 = 0.1. With the same assortment σ = 0.2 and population
share λ = 0.75, individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same payoff. Yet, as illustrated in Figure 4b, if the
mutants play ατ ∈ [0, 0.1) ∪ (0.8, 1], then they will earn more than the residents at the limit since
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)Spi with γ = (ατ − α2)/(α1 − α2).
More generally, in a coordination game under uniformly-constant assortment where piAA > piBB,
there exists an evolutionarily stable population of two types playing diverse strategies if and only if
each resident is committed to a pure strategy and σ < piBB/piAA. In this range, the Payoff Equality
is satisfied with λ = (piAA − σpiBB)/ [(1− σ)(piAA + piBB)], and any mutant would earn less since
Spi > 0.
Prisoner’s dilemma
We study the evolutionarily stability of a population made of individuals homo oeconomicus that
always defect and of individuals homo kantiensis that always cooperate, going back to our three
26As mentioned above, the only exception is when Xσ = [0, 1], any strategy gives the same payoff, and no evolution-
arily stable population exists, even for single-type population.
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10 ατ
Πθ −Πτ
(a) Evolutionarily stable population
(α1 = 1, α2 = 0)
10 α2 α1 ατ
Πθ −Πτ
(b) Non evolutionarily-stable population
(α1 = 0.8, α2 = 0.1)
Figure 4: Payoff difference between a resident population and the mutants in coordination game (piAA = 2, piBB = 1),
when the mutant share goes to zero, depending on the strategy played by mutants (ατ ), under uniformly-constant
assortment σ = 0.2.
examples: (a) Spi < 0, (b) Spi = 0 and (c) Spi > 0.
(a) First, let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 6.
With a uniformly-constant assortment σ = 1/3, then with λ = 0.5 the population satisfies the Payoff
Equality condition and Πθ = 8/3.
However, we have Spi = −1 < 0, and since the difference in payoffs between the residents and the
mutant at the limit is: Πθ − Πτ = σγ(1 − γ)Spi (Lemma 2), any mutant would earn more than the
residents at the limit as illustrated in Figure 5a. Hence we can conclude that the population is not
evolutionarily stable.
(b) Now let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 5.
We have Spi = 0, Qpi = −1+4σ and Rpi = 1−4σ. This is an additive game (Spi = 0), and as discussed
in section 3.3, the only uniformly-constant assortment allowing Payoff Equality is σ = 0.25. With
this value, any λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Payoff Equality. On the other hand, any mutant would also earn
the same payoff (see Figure 5b). In fact, this case contradicts the assumption that βσ is a singleton
in Theorem 2 since any strategy is a best-reply to another for homo hamiltonensis.
(c) Finally, let piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 4.5.
With a uniformly-constant assortment σ = 0.2, then with λ = 0.5 the population satisfies the Payoff
Equality condition and Πθ = 2.4.
Moreover, we have Spi = 0.5 > 0, and the difference in payoffs between the residents and the mutants
at the limit is: Πθ − Πτ = σγ(1 − γ)Spi (Lemma 2). Thus, for all γ ∈ (0, 1), Πθ − Πτ > 0 (see
Figure 5c) and, using similar arguments than in Theorem 2, we can conclude that this population is
evolutionarily stable.
The following proposition details when a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population of two
types playing diverse strategies (cooperate and defect) in the prisoner’s dilemma under uniformly-
constant assortment exists:
Proposition 4 (Evolutionary stability of homo oeconomicus and homo kantiensis). In a prisoner’s
dilemma under uniformly-constant assortment where Θ is rich, there exists a heterogeneous evolu-
tionarily stable population of homo oeconomicus and homo kantiensis if and only if piCC + piDD −
piDC − piCD > 0 and (piDC − piCC)/(piDC − piDD) < σ < (piDD − piCD)/(piCC − piCD).
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10 ατ
Πθ −Πτ
(a) Non evolutionarily-stable
(piCC = 4, piCD = 0, piDC = 6, piDD = 1,
σ = 1/3, λ = 0.5)
10 ατ
Πθ −Πτ
(b) Non evolutionarily-stable
(piCC = 4, piCD = 0, piDC = 5, piDD = 1,
σ = 0.25)
10 ατ
Πθ −Πτ
(c) Evolutionarily stable
(piCC = 4, piCD = 0, piDC = 4.5, piDD =
1, σ = 0.2, λ = 0.5)
Figure 5: Payoff difference between a resident population of homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus and the mutants
in prisoner’s dilemma, when the mutant share goes to zero, depending on the strategy played by mutants (ατ ), under
uniformly-constant assortment.
Proof. In AppendixC.6.
We will further discuss this result in section 5, but it is worth insisting on the importance of assor-
tative matching in making this heterogeneous population possible. It is only when the assortment is
strictly positive that individuals homo kantiensis can survive without being dominated by individuals
homo oeconomicus. Hence, assortment is critical to better understand cooperative behaviors, a result
already highlighted by Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza (1982), Bergstrom (2003) or Allen and Nowak (2015)
among others.27
5. Discussion
In this section, we first discuss the differences between a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable pop-
ulation and a population constituted by a single type of resident, homo hamiltonensis. Then, we look
at the case of non uniformly-constant assortment using a few examples. Finally, we discuss what
determines the types of preferences favored by evolution in our framework.
5.1 Heterogeneous population vs homogeneous single-type resident population
Homo hamiltonensis in a heterogeneous population
Expanding the framework of evolutionary stability formally established by Maynard Smith and
Price (1973), Alger and Weibull (2013) proved the evolutionary stability of a particular type of pref-
erence, homo hamiltonensis in a single-type homogeneous population. As first expectation, we could
have hypothesized that a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population would "on average" have a
homo hamiltonensis preference. In other words, an intuitively good candidate for a heterogeneous
evolutionarily stable population would be a population composed by fully-selfish and fully-moral in-
dividuals with a share σ of fully moral individuals in order to "mimic" a homo hamiltonensis utility.
27Cooperative behaviors can also arise in repeated games thanks to reciprocity (see e.g. Nowak and Sigmund, 2005;
Bowles and Gintis, 2004) and in public good games when participation is optional (Hauert et al., 2002).
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However, such a population is not evolutionarily stable in most cases.28 Instead, our results show
that a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population under uniformly-constant assortment depends
on Hamiltonian strategies.
Since homo hamiltonensis individuals play Hamiltonian strategies when they are the only resi-
dents, one could ask if homo hamiltonensis can always be part of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable
population. The answer is no. In fact, consider an evolutionarily stable population of two types θ1 and
θ2 committed to two different Hamiltonian strategies x1σ and x2σ. In finite 2 × 2 fitness game under
uniformly-constant and strictly positive assortment, this means that individuals of each type play the
two pure strategies. Now suppose homo hamiltonensis replaces one of the residents, what happens
then? Without loss of generality, let homo hamiltonensis replaces θ1. In this setting, θ2 individuals
always play x2σ while homo hamiltonensis individuals solve the following maximization problem:
xh ∈ argmax
x∈X
{p11 ((1− σ)pi(x, xh) + σpi(x, x)) + p21 ((1− σ)pi(x, x2σ) + σpi(x, x))} (19)
Since x2σ is a Hamiltonian strategy, we have for all x ∈ X : pi(x2σ, x2σ) ≥ (1−σ)pi(x, x2σ)+σpi(x, x), and
x2σ is also a solution of the maximization problem (19). Consequently, (x2σ, x2σ) is a Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium for the population of homo hamiltonensis and θ2. But it is not the only one. Indeed, x1σ
is solution of (19) when:
p11 [pi(x
1
σ, x
1
σ)− (1− σ)pi(x2σ, x1σ)− σpi(x2σ, x2σ)] ≥ p21 [pi(x2σ, x2σ)− (1− σ)pi(x1σ, x2σ)− σpi(x1σ, x1σ)]
Rewriting, with p11 = 1− λ+ λσ and p21 = λ(1− σ):
(1− λ+ λσ)Qpi ≥ λ(1− σ)Rpi
This inequality boils down to σ ≥ 0 and is thus always respected.29 Therefore, (x1σ, x2σ) is also a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the population of homo hamiltonensis and θ2. Hence, homo hamilto-
nensis individuals can play the two pure strategies x1σ and x2σ. Can they also play a mixed strategy?
Let xh = (αh, 1 − αh) = αhx1σ + (1 − αh)x2σ a mixed strategy (αh ∈ (0, 1)), xh is solution of (19)
when:
p11 [(1− σ)(αhpi(x1σ, x1σ) + (1− αh)pi(x1σ, x2σ)) + σpi(x1σ, x1σ)] + p21 [(1− σ)pi(x1σ, x2σ) + σpi(x1σ, x1σ)]
= p11 [(1− σ)(αhpi(x2σ, x1σ) + (1− αh)pi(x2σ, x2σ)) + σpi(x2σ, x2σ)] + p21 [pi(x2σ, x2σ)]
Using p11 = 1− λ+ λσ and Rpi/((1− σ)Spi) = 1− λ, this equation can be rewritten as:
αh =
1− λ
1− λ+ λσ ∈ (0, 1)
Consequently, when xh = ( 1−λ1−λ+λσ ,
λσ
1−λ+λσ ), (xh, x
2
σ) is also a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the pop-
ulation of homo hamiltonensis and θ2. Since the definition of evolutionary stability encompasses all
Bayesian Nash equilibria, this means that the population of homo hamiltonensis and θ2 is not evolu-
tionarily stable.30 In other words, homo hamiltonensis individuals cannot be part of a heterogeneous
28The only case in which this population is evolutionarily stable is when σ = λ and σ is a solution of σ = (pi11 −
pi21 − σ(pi22 − pi21))/((1− σ)(pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21)).
29Because Qpi = λ(1− σ)Spi and Rpi = (1− λ)(1− σ)Spi.
30Proposition 3 insures that only Hamiltonian strategies can be candidates for evolutionary stability, i.e. only the
two pure strategies in this context.
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evolutionarily stable population playing diverse strategies.
Equilibrium implications
In the classical setting of a homogeneous, single-type resident population, all resident individ-
uals in the population play the same strategy. We show that this characteristic is not necessary
for evolutionary stability by proving the existence of a heterogeneous population exhibiting diverse
strategies played by resident individuals without infringing the evolutionary stability (Theorem 2).
For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma, the classical setting suggests that, when no mixed Hamilto-
nian strategy exists (i.e. when piCC + piDD − piDC − piCD > 0), all homo hamiltonensis individuals
either cooperate or defect, i.e. they all behave as a homo oeconomicus and defect, or they all behave
as a homo kantiensis and cooperate. On the other hand, proposition 4 establishes the existence of
a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population with a share of defectors homo oeconomicus and of
cooperators homo kantiensis.
This last result is more in line with empirical observations. In single trial public goods experiments
for instance, results display between 40% and 60% contribution to the public good (Marwell and Ames,
1981; Dawes and Thaler, 1988). A population of homo hamiltonensis all playing a mixed strategy
in prisoner’s dilemma could support this empirical observation when piCC + piDD − piDC − piCD < 0
but not when piCC + piDD − piDC − piCD > 0 (Lemma 3). In the latter case, only a heterogeneous
population would justify the observations.
Finally, the introduction of assortative matching between preferences has a key implication when
studying and interpreting equilibria in games. In his thesis, John Nash discussed two interpretations
of a mixed Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950, 1951). In the first interpretation, an individual randomizes
his play before acting, for instance by throwing a dice or a coin. In the second, called "mass-action",
individuals of a large population play one of the pure strategies composing the mixed equilibrium
with the share of people playing each strategy being equal to the weight of the strategy in the equi-
librium.31 Similarly, in the original and static evolutionary game theory framework (Maynard Smith,
1974), a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy can either describe a "monomorphic" population of iden-
tical individuals randomizing their behavior, or a heterogeneous population (called "polymorphic" in
biology) of several types of individuals, each type playing a pure strategy. Under uniform random
matching, the two interpretations are equivalent. Thus, the static framework could not distinguish
between a monomorphic and a polymorphic population, which led to the emergence of the evolution-
ary game dynamics framework (Bergstrom and Godfrey-Smith, 1998). However, when the matching
is assortative, a monomorphic and a polymorphic population would not yield the same equilibrium,
as already observed by Grafen (1979) and Hines and Maynard Smith (1979). In other words, the first
and second interpretation of a mixed equilibrium are no longer equivalent when a distinct preference
is associated to each strategy.
5.2 The case of state-dependent assortment
Throughout most of this paper, we assumed a uniformly-constant assortment matrix highlighting
some relevant results. In this section, we discuss the more general case of non uniformly-constant
assortment studying the same prisoner’s dilemma as in section 3.3 and 4.3. We find that a non
uniformly-constant assortment not only allows diverse evolutionarily stable populations, but also ren-
der these population more robust to mutant invasion.
31See also Leonard (1994) and Weibull (1994) for a discussion of the mass-action interpretation of Nash equilibria.
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Motivation
As highlighted in the literature, the phenomenon of homophily is highly dependent on the context.
The size and demographic characteristics of the community considered affect the degree of homophily
among its members (McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009).32 Therefore, going beyond
the classical case of an assortative matching that is uniform across all types in the population and
independent of the share in the population, we evaluate the impact of relaxing the assumption of a
uniformly constant assortment on the equilibria and their evolutionary stability.
Payoffs under non uniformly-constant assortment
We first write the payoffs of each type at the limit when the mutant share goes to zero to
show the differences with the uniformly-constant assortment case. Let (x1, x2, xτ ) ∈ BNE(s), with
s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0) the population state. We note Π1 = Π1(x1, x2, xτ , λ, 0), Π2 = Π2(x1, x2, xτ , λ, 0)
and Πτ = Πτ (x1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) the average payoffs obtained by individuals of types θ1, θ2 and τ at the
limit (i.e. when the share of the mutant tends to zero). Moreover, we set φ12 = φ12(λ, 0) = φ21(λ, 0)
for the assortment between types θ1 and θ2 at the limit. Finally, we call Γ = limε→0(φτ1 − φτ2)/ε.
We can then express the payoffs of each type at the limit as a function of the population share and
assortment functions using equations (B.2):
Π1 = (1− λ+ λφ12) · pi11 + λ(1− φ12) · pi12
Π2 = (1− λ)(1− φ12) · pi21 + (λ+ (1− λ)φ12) · pi22
Πτ = ((1− λ)(1− σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ) · piτ1 + (λ(1− σ) + λ(1− λ)Γ) · piτ2 + σ · piττ
In the uniformly-constant assortment case, we had φ12 = σ and Γ = 0. As discussed in AppendixB,
the limit Γ can be interpreted as the matching probability difference between mutants and residents
of the two types: Γ = limε→0(pτ2− pτ1)/ε. In other words, if individuals θ1 and θ2 meet the mutants
at the same rate when they enter the population, then Γ = 0, while if residents of one type meet the
mutants at a higher rate than the other residents do then Γ 6= 0. Moreover, when the assortment
functions φτ1 and φτ2 are differentiable in ε = 0, we have Γ = φ′τ1(λ, 0)− φ′τ2(λ, 0)33. Therefore, Γ is
the marginal assortment difference between mutants and residents of the two types.
Consider the case of a prisoner’s dilemma, suppose that the residents satisfy the Payoff Equality
and for all i ∈ {1, 2, τ}, let αi ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that individuals θ1, θ2 and τ attach to the
strategy "cooperate". If α1 6= α2, there exists γ ∈ R such that ατ = γα1 + (1−γ)α2 (cf. section 4.2).
It is then possible to write the difference in payoff between the residents and the mutants when the
share of the mutant goes to zero (see the proof of Lemma 2 in AppendixC.4 for detailed calculations):
Πθ −Πτ = [γ(1− γ)σ + γλ(φ12 − σ) + γλ(1− λ)Γ] · (α1 − α2)2 · (piCC + piDD − piCD − piDC)
+ [(1− γ − λ)(φ12 − σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ] · (α1 − α2) · [α2(piCD − piCC) + (1− α2)(piDD − piDC)]
On the survival of selfish and moral individuals
We consider the example studied above (Sections 3.3 and 4.3). The objective is to analyze if non
uniformly-constant assortment enables the evolutionary stability of a heterogeneous population made
32Precisely, Currarini et al. (2009) find that the homophily in most US ethnic groups is nonlinear and non-monotonous
in the group size and McPherson et al. (2001) shows that homophily depends on sociodemographic, behavioral, and
intrapersonal characteristics.
33Noting φ′τi(λ, 0) = ∂φτi(λ, 0)/∂ε
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of homo kantiensis (θ1) and homo oeconomicus (θ2). Given the great number of cases offered by the
relaxation of the uniformly-constant assortment hypothesis, we consider here a specific case:
1. We suppose that φ12(λ, 0) = 0.24λ+ 0.08. Thus, when the share of homo oeconomicus λ goes
to zero, φ12(0, 0) = φ21(0, 0) = 0.08. This means that when the type θ2 individuals (homo
oeconomicus) are mutants in a population made of two types s = (θ1, θ2, 0), their assortativity
is 0.08. In other words, for s = (θ1, θ2, 0), the probability for a homo oeconomicus to meet
another homo oeconomicus is p22 = 0.08. Reciprocally, when θ1 (homo kantiensis) is a mutant
in a population made of two types s = (θ1, θ2, 1), its assortativity is 0.32. Consequently,
the shape of φ12(·, 0) increases the evolutionary-success opportunities of each type: a homo
oeconomicus is better off when its probability to meet another homo oeconomicus is low, while
a homo kantiensis is better off meeting another homo kantiensis with a high probability.
2. We also suppose that Γ = (1−σ)/λ. This shape allows p1τ and p2τ to belong to [0, 1]. Moreover,
it means that p1τ = 0 and p2τ = 1 − σ, i.e. a mutant either meet a homo oeconomicus or
another mutant, which increases the likelihood that the population of homo kantiensis and
homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable.
With these assumptions, we find for each case previously studied an evolutionarily stable popula-
tion of homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus. This contrasts with the case of a uniformly-constant
assortment, in which there is no evolutionarily stable population when Spi is negative. However, note
that if σ = 1 and if the mutants play the strategy "cooperate", they will always earn more than the
residents. Hence, there is a maximum value of σ allowing the evolutionary stability of the population
under non uniformly-constant assortment.
(a) When Spi < 0 with piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 6. For λ = 5/6, φ12 = 0.28,
homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus individuals get the same total payoff Πθ = 1.6. Moreover, for
σ < 0.4, the residents earn a strictly greater payoff than any mutant at the limit, and thus following
the same arguments as in Theorem 2, the population is evolutionarily stable (see Figure 6a).
(b) When Spi = 0 with piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 5. Recall that the Payoff Equality
is satisfied if and only if φ12 = 0.25. This value is reached for λ = 17/24. Then, homo kantiensis
and homo oeconomicus individuals get the same total payoff Πθ = 1.875 > Πτ for any mutant when
σ < 0.46875 (see Figure 6b). Thus an evolutionarily stable population exists when σ < 0.46875.
(c) Finally, when Spi > 0 with piCD = 0, piDD = 1, piCC = 4 and piDC = 4.5. For λ = 0.5, φ12 = 0.2
and homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus individuals get the same total payoff Πθ = 2.4 strictly
greater than Πτ for any mutant when σ < 0.6 and thus the population is evolutionarily stable (see
Figure 6c).
Note that the share of homo kantiensis (1-λ) increases with Spi = piCC−piCD+piDD−piDC . When
Spi < 0, there is about 17% of homo kantiensis in the population while this share rises up to 50%
when Spi > 0. This comes as no surprise. Indeed, piCC − piCD can be interpreted as the gain minus
the cost of cooperation, and piDC − piDD the gain minus the cost of defection. In our examples, we
changed only the value of piDC . A decrease in piDC increases the relative benefit of cooperation and
thus the share of homo kantiensis.
Finally, both homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus are important for the evolutionary success
of the population, but in a different way. On the one hand, individuals homo kantiensis drive up the
average payoff of the population since Πθ increases with the share of homo kantiensis. On the other
hand, individuals homo oeconomicus help to resist the invasion of mutants. In fact, suppose that
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Figure 6: Payoff difference between a resident population of homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus and the mutants
in prisoner’s dilemma, when the mutant share goes to zero, depending on the strategy played by mutants (ατ )
mutants are matched with homo kantiensis with greater probability than with homo oeconomicus.
For instance, let Γ = −(1− σ)/(1− λ). Then, in the case of σ = 0, the mutants would at least earn
Πτ = 4 and the heterogeneous resident population would not be evolutionarily stable. The matching
speed Γ governs which residents the mutants are more likely to meet. Thus, Γ plays a central role in
the analysis of evolutionary stability.
The diversity of heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population
Although we focused on a population of homo kantiensis and homo oeconomicus, there also exists
heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population in which the residents do not necessarily play the pure
strategies "cooperate" and "defect" under a non uniformly-constant assortment. Thus, they are not
necessarily homo kantiensis or homo oeconomicus. Going back to our three examples:
(a) Suppose that individuals θ1 cooperate with probability α1 = 0.78 and that individuals θ2
cooperate with probability α2 = 0.1. For λ = 5/6, φ12 = 0.28, and individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same
average payoff Πθ = 1.78984. When σ = 0.2, the residents earn more than any mutant at the limit
and the population is therefore evolutionarily stable (see Figure 7a).
(b) When individuals θ1 cooperate with probability α1 = 0.8 and individuals θ2 cooperate with
probability α2 = 0.4, for λ = 17/24, φ12 = 0.25, we have that individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same
average payoff Πθ = 2.55. Hence, when σ = 0.2, the residents earn more than any mutant at the
limit rendering the population evolutionarily stable (see Figure 7b).
(c) Finally, suppose that individuals θ1 cooperate with probability α1 = 0.85 and individuals θ2
cooperate with probability α2 = 0.15. For λ = 0.5, φ12 = 0.2, individuals θ1 and θ2 get the same
average payoff Πθ = 2.38725. Therefore, for σ = 0.2, the residents earn more than any mutant at the
limit and the resident population is evolutionarily stable (see Figure 7c).
Relaxing the assumption of uniformly-constant assortment, we find a variety of heterogeneous
evolutionarily stable populations. We notably observe that resident individuals can play strategies
outside the set of Hamiltonian strategies and that mixed strategies can be observed in a heterogeneous
evolutionarily stable population.
Note also that these populations are more robust than under uniformly-constant assortment. For
instance, when σ = 0.2, the residents earn a strictly greater payoff than all the mutants, including
the behaviorally-alike, in all the cases (see Figures 6 and 7). This also provides an evolutionary
justification in favor of the heterogeneity of preferences. Indeed, if there is a single resident type in
the population, then this type is homo moralis with a morality coefficient κ = 0.2 (or a behaviorally-
alike). However, if the assortativity σ evolves, then all resident individuals become vulnerable to the
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Figure 7: Payoff difference between a resident population playing mixed strategies ((a) (α1, α2) = (0.78, 0.1); (b)
(α1, α2) = (0.8, 0.4); (c) (α1, α2) = (0.85, 0.15)) and the mutants in prisoner’s dilemma, when the mutant share tends
to zero, depending on the strategy played by mutants (ατ )
entry of mutants. For instance, in the case Spi positive and σ = 0.2, the Hamiltonian strategies are
defect and cooperate. Now, if the assortativity goes to zero, the only evolutionarily stable strategy
is defect, and homo moralis with morality κ = 0.2 is no more evolutionarily stable.34 Conversely, in
a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population, types who would not be evolutionarily stable alone
mutually contribute to resist the invasion of mutants, and they are less sensitive to variations in the
assortativity. More specifically, the identified population remains evolutionarily stable as long as the
assortativity does not exceed a threshold that depends on the population state and the game payoffs
(see Figures 6).35 In particular, they remain evolutionarily stable when the assortativity goes to zero.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the shapes of φ12 and Γ were set arbitrarily. These
examples aim at introducing the case of non uniformly-constant assortment. A more in-depth anal-
ysis of this type of situation is needed to derive more generic results and to better understand the
conditions under which heterogeneous evolutionarily stable populations exist in this case.
5.3 Context-based preferences
Game-dependent diversity
A key property in the case of a homogeneous single-type resident population is the evolutionary
stability of the homo hamiltonensis type of preference regardless of the game being played. In other
words, as long as the assortativity is set and constant, in any game between assortatively matched
individuals, only those behaviorally alike to homo hamiltonensis will resist mutant invasion. In this
paper, proving the evolutionary stability of other types of preferences when allowing for the presence
of more than one resident type in the population, we show that this evolutionary stability depends on
the game being played. Specifically, we find that both the assortment properties and the game payoffs
determine whether a heterogeneous population is evolutionarily stable. In a prisoner’s dilemma for
instance, under uniformly-constant assortment, the evolutionary stability of a population of homo
oeconomicus and homo kantiensis individuals depends on the sign of piCC + piDD − piCD − piDC and
the value of assortativity σ (Proposition 4). As for coordination games, in the example in section
4.3.1, a population composed of homo oeconomicus and homo kantiensis is not evolutionarily stable
because homo oeconomicus individuals can also play a mixed strategy, incompatible with evolutionary
34Because one of his Bayesian Nash equilibria is the cooperation strategy, and the definition of evolutionary stability
encompasses all Bayesian Nash equilibria.
35If the assortativity is mutant-dependent and can take any value (σ ∈ [0, 1]), then there does not exist any evolu-
tionarily stable population, as proved by Newton (2017) in the classical setting of one resident.
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stability (Proposition 3 and Theorem 2).36 Hence, the prevailing preferences in a population depend
on the context. This finding is in line with earlier research stating that the economic environment
determines the prevalence of self-interested or altruistic behaviors (Bester and Güth, 1998) and of
self-interested or fair behaviors (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Empirical evidence also suggests that
choices and preferences can change according to the context (Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Rieskamp
et al., 2006; Masatlioglu et al., 2012; Bordalo et al., 2013). As examples, economic crises modify the
attitude toward risks (Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018) and the social, economic and institutional settings
affect cooperative behaviors (Shogren and Taylor, 2008). In our framework, a socio-economic shock
would translate into a change in the payoffs and in the homophily (i.e. the assortment), which would,
in turn, affect the prevailing preferences in the population.
This dependence on the context has significant implications for empirical testing. Since the game
and the context affect the behavior of agents, experiments should give particular attention to the
conditions under which experiments are performed (statement of payoffs, cost of actions, available
options, ties between subjects, etc.). While empirical behavioral research often aims at finding the
parameters of the preferences of individuals, it would be an interesting challenge to try to estimate
how diverse a population is. Considering a distribution of homo moralis with different morality
coefficients, what is the shape of this distribution? The framework developed in this paper could be
tested in lab experiments. For instance, in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, does our simplified
model explain the share of individuals cooperating? Is there assortment between individuals with
similar preferences, and if so, what is the shape of assortment functions in different contexts and
cultures? In all these experiments, the choice of payoffs in the game is central, since different payoffs
lead to different evolutionary stability profiles.
Unobserved diversity of preferences
In Proposition 4, we have detailed the conditions under which a population of selfish homo oeco-
nomicus and fully-moral homo kantiensis can be evolutionarily stable in a prisoner’s dilemma under
uniformly-constant assortment. This result can be extended to the behaviorally-alike of homo oe-
conomicus and homo kantiensis. In particular, individuals caring only for the payoff of others such
as fully-altruistic or fully-empathetic individuals would always cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma.37
Thus, they can be part of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population with homo oeconomicus
individuals.
Is it more likely to find moral or altruist individuals in a population? Our framework provides a
theoretical-justification to the observed diversity of behaviors and preferences but cannot answer this
question. Thus, it would be interesting to empirically test which social preferences explain individuals’
choices better. For instance, Miettinen et al. (2017) have recently shown that homo moralis has a
higher explanatory power than altruistic preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma. However,
scientists can only observe the strategies chosen by individuals and not their true preferences. As
discussed above, these strategies are context-dependent. Hence, further investigation varying the
games and the context of the experiment would help identify individual preferences with greater
precision and better understand the individual motives behind the observed decisions.
36Individuals homo kantiensis (θ1) always play the socially-optimal strategy A. On the other hand, individuals homo
oeconomicus (θ2) can play strategies A, B, or the mixed strategy (1/6, 5/6) (similar arguments as in section 5.1.1).
37The utility of fully-altruistic and fully-empathetic individuals is u(x, y) = pi(y, x). See also Alger and Weibull
(2017) for a discussion of the strategic behaviors of moralists and altruists.
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6. Conclusion
In many countries and contexts we see some people consistently deciding not to vote, not to donate
to charity or not to cooperate in public good games while some other prefer to do so. Following
this empirical observation of various behaviors among individuals in a population, we extend the
classical framework of evolutionary stability of preferences by allowing heterogeneity in individual
preferences in the context of assortative interaction with imperfect information. We generalize the
concept of assortment function to assortment functions matrix to model homophily between the
different types of preferences in a population. In the case of uniformly-constant assortment, we
prove that a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population of two types always exists: individuals
of this population earn the same payoff and resist a small-scale invasion of mutants. Moreover,
we find that the two types should play Hamiltonian strategies, the strategies played by a certain
homo moralis when this type is the only one in the population. Finally, we show how and when a
heterogeneous population made of fully-selfish individuals, homo oeconomicus, and fully-moral ones,
homo kantiensis, is evolutionarily stable in prisoner’s dilemmas.
In a heterogeneous environment, individuals do not necessarily play the same strategy. Thus, our
work helps in understanding the driving forces behind strategic behavior such as cooperation and
defection in social dilemma or the diverse contribution to public goods. We believe that an in-depth
investigation of the observed variability of behaviors among agents when voting, performing environ-
mentally friendly actions or donating money is necessary. Hence, further work on the implications
of accounting for the diversity of preferences in a population would bring valuable insights for policy
makers and allow a better crafting of public policies.
More generally, this paper intends to give a theoretical framework pushing the development of
analyses accounting for a diversity of preferences under assortative matching. Many extensions and
improvements can be undertaken to deepen the understanding of heterogeneous populations. First,
exploring the case of non uniformly-constant assortment, which we briefly discussed in section 5.2, is
key to better comprehend the role assortment plays in allowing for the diversity of preferences. Then,
it would be interesting to study how to define assortment in the case of a distribution of preferences
in order to reconcile our framework with the one of Dekel et al. (2007). The assortment could also
be rendered endogenous by including informational and strategic features into the game. Second,
the analysis of a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population could be extended to finite games
with more than two pure strategies and more than two resident types, and to infinite games. Would
Hamiltonian strategies still be favored under uniformly-constant assortment? Finally, in our analy-
sis, we favored a static framework because we investigated under which conditions a heterogeneous
population is evolutionarily stable to the invasion of a mutant preference. It would be helpful to an-
alyze how the preferences in a heterogeneous population evolve under assortative matching using an
evolutionary game dynamics framework. We expect that some equilibria we found in the static case
could not be reached in a dynamic setting, depending on the evolutionary process, i.e. the replicator.
This paper aims at opening the way towards better consideration of the diversity of preferences
and of assortative matching, moving away from the more classical use of representative agents and
homogeneous populations in future theoretical and empirical studies.
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AppendixA. The Algebra of assortative matching
In a population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, λτ ), the assortment matrix is Φ = ((φij(λ1, ..., λn, λτ )))(i,j)∈I2
such as for all (i, j) ∈ I2, φij(λ1, ..., λn, λτ ) = pii − pij .38 To be well defined, the matching process
must satisfy two sets of conditions:
• The matching conditions: for all i ∈ I, ∑
j∈I
pji = 1 (5)
• The balancing conditions: for all (i, j) ∈ I2, λj · pij = λi · pji (6)
These conditions imply another set of conditions on the assortment functions φij , which we call
assortment balancing conditions.
Assortment balancing condition
Property 1 (Assortment balancing condition). The assortment matrix satisfies the assortment
balancing conditions (11) when:
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2 : λj ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφik
)
− φij
]
= λi ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφjk
)
− φji
]
If the matching process satisfies the matching and balancing conditions, then the assortment matrix
must satisfy the assortment balancing conditions.
Proof.
λj ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφik
)
− φij
]
− λi ·
[(∑
k∈I
λkφjk
)
− φji
]
=
∑
k∈I
λjλkpii −
∑
k∈I
λjλkpik − λjpii + λjpij −
∑
k∈I
λiλkpjj +
∑
k∈I
λiλkpjk + λipjj − λipji
=λjpii −
∑
k∈I
λjλipki − λjpii + λipji − λipjj +
∑
k∈I
λiλjpkj + λipjj − λipji
=λiλj
[∑
k∈I
pkj −
∑
k∈I
pki
]
=0
The assortment balancing conditions impose a particular relationship between the assortment
functions. For example, as noted by Bergstrom (2003) in the case of assortative encounters between
two types, the assortment φ12 = p11 − p12 defined between a type θ1 and a type θ2 is equal to the
assortment φ21 = p22 − p21 defined between θ2 and θ1.
38I = (J1 ..nK ∪ {τ})
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Property 2 (Assortment matrix in a population of two types). When s = (θ1, θ2, λ1, λ2) with
(λ1, λ2) ∈ (0, 1)2, if the matching process satisfies the matching and balancing conditions, then the
assortment matrix Φ is symmetric, i.e. we have φ12(λ1, λ2) = φ21(λ1, λ2).
Proof. When s = (θ1, θ2, λ1, λ2), the assortment balancing conditions boils down to λ2(λ2 − 1)φ12 =
λ1(λ1 − 1)φ21. Since λ2 = 1− λ1, we get φ12 = φ21.
When a third type θτ is part of the population, Property 2 does not hold anymore, i.e. for all
ε > 0 we do not necessarily have φ12(λ1, λ2, ε) = φ21(λ1, λ2, ε). However, at the limit when the share
of the third type goes to zero, the residents are matched between them, as if there was no mutants,
and thus we have φ12 = φ21. Formally:
Property 3 (Assortment matrix in a population of two residents and one mutant). When
s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ1, λ2, ε) with (λ1, λ2, ε) ∈ (0, 1)3, if the matching process satisfies the matching and
balancing conditions, then we have limε→0 φ12(λ1, λ2, ε) = limε→0 φ21(λ1, λ2, ε).
Proof. When s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ1, λ2, ε), the assortment balancing conditions are:
λ2 (λ2φ12 + εφ1τ − φ12) = λ1 (λ1φ21 + εφ2τ − φ21)
ε (λ2φ12 + εφ1τ − φ1τ ) = λ1 (λ1φτ1 + λ2φτ2 − φτ1)
ε (λ1φ21 + εφ2τ − φ2τ ) = λ2 (λ1φτ1 + λ2φτ2 − φτ2)
Rewriting the first equation, we get:
φ21 =
λ2(1− λ2)φ12 + ε(λ1φ2τ − λ2φ1τ )
λ1(1− λ1)
Note that for all (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, τ}2, φij = pii − pij is bounded and belongs to [−1, 1]. Let λ be the
limit of λ2 when ε goes to zero. We have limε→0 λ2(1−λ2) = limε→0 λ1(1−λ1) = λ(1−λ), and thus
limε→0 φ12(λ1, λ2, ε) = limε→0 φ21(λ1, λ2, ε).
Using the definition of assortativity, the assortment functions φij : (0, 1)n+1 → [−1, 1] can be
extended by continuity to (0, 1)n × [0, 1) to cover the limit when the mutant share ε goes to zero.
Therefore, Property 3 can be rewritten as φ12(λ1, λ2, 0) = φ21(λ1, λ2, 0). For coherence, we will
impose that φ12(λ1, λ2, 0) = φ12(λ1, λ2). Indeed, a population consisting of two types could also be
described as a population of three types when the share of the third type is zero.
Matching probabilities
It is possible to write the conditional probabilities pij in function of the assortment functions φij
and the population shares. Let (S) be the system of equations defined by matching conditions (5),
balancing conditions (6) and assortment conditions (10):
(S)

∀ i ∈ I,∑
j∈I
pji = 1
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, λj · pij = λi · pji
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, φij = pii − pij
(A.1)
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When the assortment matrix Φ satisfies the assortment balancing conditions, the system (S) has
a unique solution:
∀(i, j) ∈ I2 : pij = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij (A.2)
Proof. In AppendixC.1
The existence and uniqueness of solution A.2 also means that there are (n+1)2 linearly-independent
equations in the system (S) because there are (n+1)2 unknowns pij . We have (n+1) matching condi-
tions (5),
(
n+ 1
2
)
balancing conditions (6) and 2×
(
n+ 1
2
)
assortment conditions (10) (the diagonal
of the assortment matrix adds no conditions since the φii = pii−pii). Thus, there are (n+1)2+
(
n+ 1
2
)
equations in (S). However, the
(
n+ 1
2
)
assortment balancing conditions allow to express
(
n+ 1
2
)
assortment functions as a function of the others which gives (n + 1)2 linearly-independent equations
in (S).
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AppendixB. The case of two resident types (n=2)
We apply the model to the case of three types: two resident types (θ1 and θ2) and one mutant θτ .
The three types and their respective shares define a population state s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ1, λ2, ε), where
(λ1, λ2, ε) ∈ (0, 1)3 are the population shares of θ1, θ2 and θτ .
We can explicit the conditional probabilities computed in (A.2):
p11 = λ1 + λ2 · φ12 + ε · φ1τ
p12 = λ1 + λ2 · φ12 + ε · φ1τ − φ12
p1τ = λ1 + λ2 · φ12 + ε · φ1τ − φ1τ
p21 = λ2 + λ1 · φ21 + ε · φ2τ − φ21
p22 = λ2 + λ1 · φ21 + ε · φ2τ
p2τ = λ2 + λ1 · φ21 + ε · φ2τ − φ2τ
pτ1 = ε+ λ1 · φτ1 + λ2 · φτ2 − φτ1
pτ2 = ε+ λ1 · φτ1 + λ2 · φτ2 − φτ2
pττ = ε+ λ1 · φτ1 + λ2 · φτ2
(B.1)
We can then calculate the limits of the conditional probabilities when the mutant share ε tends
to zero. First note that for all (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, τ}2, φij is bounded, and thus limε→0 εφij = 0. Also, the
definition of assortativity (8) implies that: for all i ∈ I, limε→0 φτi = σ.
Let λε ∈ (0, 1) be the share of θ2 with respect to θ1. We thus have λ1 = (1 − λε)(1 − ε), and
λ2 = λε(1 − ε). Then noting λ ∈ (0, 1) the share of θ2 with respect to θ1 when ε goes to zero, we
have: limε→0 λε = λ = limε→0 λ2 and limε→0 λ1 = (1− λ).
From Property 3, we have: φ12(1− λ, λ, 0) = φ21(1− λ, λ, 0) = φ12(λ).
Finally, we need to compute the limits of φ1τ and φ2τ . Using the assortment balancing conditions
(detailed in the proof of Property 3), we have:
φ1τ =
λ2
1− εφ12 +
λ1
1− ε
(1− λ1)φτ1 − λ2φτ2
ε
φ2τ =
λ1
1− εφ21 +
λ2
1− ε
(1− λ2)φτ2 − λ1φτ1
ε
The limits of φ1τ and φ2τ when ε goes to zero are:
lim
ε→0
φ1τ = λφ12(λ) + (1− λ) lim
ε→0
(λε + ε− λεε)φτ1 − (λε − λεε)φτ2
ε
= λφ12(λ) + (1− λ) lim
ε→0
[
(1− λε)φτ1 + λεφτ2 + λεφτ1 − φτ2
ε
]
= λφ12(λ) + (1− λ)σ + λ(1− λ)Γ
lim
ε→0
φ2τ = (1− λ)φ12(λ) + λ lim
ε→0
(1− λε + λεε)φτ2 − (1− λε − ε+ λεε)φτ1
ε
= (1− λ)φ12(λ) + λ lim
ε→0
[
(1− λε)φτ1 + λεφτ2 − (1− λε)φτ1 − φτ2
ε
]
= (1− λ)φ12(λ) + λσ − λ(1− λ)Γ
where Γ = limε→0 φτ1−φτ2ε .
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Putting it all together, the limits of the conditional probabilities are:
limε→0 p11 = (1− λ) + λ · φ12(λ)
limε→0 p12 = (1− λ) · (1− φ12(λ))
limε→0 p1τ = (1− λ) · (1− σ)− λ · (1− λ) · Γ
limε→0 p21 = λ · (1− φ12(λ))
limε→0 p22 = λ+ (1− λ) · φ12(λ)
limε→0 p2τ = λ · (1− σ) + λ · (1− λ) · Γ
limε→0 pτ1 = 0
limε→0 pτ2 = 0
limε→0 pττ = σ
(B.2)
Note that when ε goes to zero, we have pτ1 = pτ2 = 0, and individuals of type θ1 and θ2 behave
as if individuals θτ were not in the population. Bayesian Nash equilibria of θ1 and θ2 are then the
same as in Definition 2. Moreover, the conditional probabilities p11, p21, p12 and p22 are consistent
with the classical setting (Bergstrom, 2003; Alger and Weibull, 2013).
When the assortment matrix is uniformly constant, we have φ12(λ) = σ and Γ = 0. The limit
Γ can be interpreted as the matching probability difference between mutants and residents of the
two types: Γ = limε→0(pτ2 − pτ1)/ε. In other words, if individuals θ1 and θ2 meet the mutants
at the same rate when they enter the population, then Γ = 0, while if residents of one type meet
the mutants at a higher rate than the other residents do then Γ 6= 0. Finally, when the assortment
functions φτ1 and φτ2 are differentiable in ε = 0, we have Γ = φ′τ1(λ, 0) − φ′τ2(λ, 0)39 because
φτ1(1 − λ, λ, 0) = φτ2(1 − λ, λ, 0) = σ. Therefore, Γ is the marginal assortment difference between
mutants and residents of the two types.
39Noting φ′τi(λ, 0) = ∂φτi(λ, 0)/∂ε
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AppendixC. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
AppendixC.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let (S) be the system of equations defined by matching conditions (5), balancing conditions (6)
and assortment conditions (10):
(S)

∀ i ∈ I,∑
j∈I
pji = 1
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, λj · pij = λi · pji
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, φij = pii − pij
Suppose there exists matching probabilities pij solutions of the system (S). Since
∑
k∈I
pki = 1,
we have
∑
k∈I
λipki = λi for all i ∈ I. Using the balancing conditions, we get λi −
∑
k∈I
λkpik = 0.
Moreover, since
∑
k∈I
λk = 1, we have pii =
∑
k∈I
λkpii. Adding these two equations, we obtain pii =
λi +
∑
k∈I
λk(pii − pik) for all i ∈ I, i.e. pii = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik. Since for all (i, j) ∈ I2, pij = pii − φij ,
we get pij = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij . We have proven that if a solution of (S) exists, then it must be
pij = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij (12).
We now show that qij = λi+
∑
k∈I
λkφik−φij (12) is solution of (S) using the assortment balancing
conditions:
∀ j ∈ I, ∑
i∈I
qij =
∑
i∈I
[
λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij
]
= 1 +
∑
i∈I
λi
λj
[∑
k∈I
λkφjk − φji
]
= 1 + 1λj
[∑
k∈I
λkφjk −
∑
i∈I
λiφji
]
= 1
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, λjqij − λiqji = λjλi + λj
[∑
k∈I
λkφik − φij
]
− λiλj − λi
[∑
k∈I
λkφjk − φji
]
= 0
∀ (i, j) ∈ I2, qii − qij = λi +
∑
k∈I
λkφik − λi −
∑
k∈I
λkφik + φij = φij
AppendixC.2 Proof of Lemma 1
This proof extends the proof provided by Alger and Weibull (2013) for one resident type to the
case of n > 1 resident types.
First, from Definition 6 we have that, in a population state s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε),
(x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ ) ∈ Xn+1 is a type-homogeneous Bayesian Nash equilibrium if::
∀i ∈ I : xi ∈ argmax
x∈X
∑
j∈I
(
pij · ui(x, xj)
)
(C.1)
Hence, rewriting with the assortment matrix Φ, we get:
∀i ∈ I : xi ∈ argmax
x∈X
∑
j∈I
([
λi +
((∑
k∈I
λkφik
)
− φij
)]
· ui(x, xj)
)
(C.2)
Since for all i ∈ I, ui is continuous and X is compact, then Weierstrass’s maximum theorem
implies that the right hand side in C.2 defines a non-empty and compact set for all (λ1, ..., λn, ε) ∈
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(0, 1)n× [0, 1). The solutions to C.2 can thus be written as the set of fixed points of a compact valued
and upper hemi-continuous correspondence (Aliprantis and Border, 2006) Bλ : Xn+1 ⇒ Xn+1. This
set is therefore closed, and BNE(s) is compact for each s = (θ1, ..., θn, θτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) ∈ Θn+1 ×
(0, 1)n × [0, 1).
Second, since for all i ∈ I, ui is concave in the first argument then Bλ is convex-valued and has a
fixed point by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem which establishes the fact that BNE(s) is non-empty.
Third, fixing the (θi)i∈I , we can write the maximands in C.2 as Ui(x, x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε).
We note Ui∗(x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) = maxx∈XUi(x, x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε). Since the
(Ui)i∈I are continuous, Berge’s maximum theorem implies that their maximum over X, Ui∗, are also
continuous. Moreover, by definition of BNE(s), we have, (x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ ) ∈ BNE(s) if and only if
for all i ∈ I:
Ui
∗(x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε)− Ui(x, x1, x2, ..., xn, xτ , λ1, ..., λn, ε) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X (C.3)
For all i ∈ J1 ..nK let < λi,t >t∈N→ λ0i and let < εt >t∈N→ ε0. If (x1t , x2t , ..., xnt , xτt ) ∈ BNE(s) and for
all i ∈ I, xit → xi,0, we have by continuity on the left-hand side in C.3, for all i ∈ I:
Ui
∗(x1,0, x2,0, ..., xn,0, xτ,0, λ01, ..., λ
0
n, ε
0)− Ui(x, x1,0, x2,0, ..., xn,0, xτ,0, λ01, ..., λ0n, ε0) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X
(C.4)
This last results proves that (x1,0, x2,0, ..., xn,0, xτ,0) ∈ BNE(s) and therefore that the correspondence
BNE(θ1, ..., θn, θτ , ·) : (0, 1)n × [0, 1)⇒ Xn+1 is upper hemi-continuous.
AppendixC.3 Proof of Proposition 2
First, let’s assume that Payoff Equality is satisfied. We distinguish two cases:
When φ12 = 1:
Since we have Payoff Equality, equations (17) and (18) are satisfied and we necessarily have that
Qpi = Rpi = 0 (since (1− φ12) = 0). Then either Spi = 0 and we are in case 1. of the proposition, or
Spi 6= 0 and we are in case 3. of the proposition.
When φ12 6= 1:
Payoff equality (equations (17) and (18)) implies only two possibilities.
Either Qpi = 0 and then Spi = 0 and we are in the case 1. of the proposition.
Or Qpi 6= 0 and then since (1− φ12) > 0 and λ > 0, Qpi and Spi are of the same sign. Moreover, since
λ < 1, Rpi and Spi have the same sign. Finally, dividing (17) by Spi 6= 0 we have: λ(1−φ12) = Qpi/Spi
and we are in case 2. of the proposition.
For the converse, using similar arguments, if one of the three cases (1.,2.,3. of Proposition 1) is
true then the condition stated in equation (17) is satisfied and we have Payoff Equality.
AppendixC.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Let (x1, x2, xτ ) ∈ X3 be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the population s = (θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, ε) and
suppose that the population s = (θ1, θ2, λ) satisfies the Payoff Equality condition: Π1(x1, x2, λ) =
Π2(x
1, x2, λ) = Πθ.
For all (i, j) ∈ I2, we note pi(xi, xj) = piij . We can write the payoffs obtained by each type when
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ε goes to zero using the conditional probabilities B.2:
Π1(x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) = Π1 = (1− λ+ λφ12) · pi11 + λ(1− φ12) · pi12
Π2(x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) = Π2 = (1− λ)(1− φ12) · pi21 + (λ+ (1− λ)φ12) · pi22
Πτ (x
1, x2, xτ , λ, 0) = Πτ = [(1− λ)(1− σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ] · piτ1 + [λ(1− σ) + λ(1− λ)Γ] · piτ2 + σ · piττ
In a finite symmetric 2 × 2 fitness games, let A be the matrix of the payoffs in this game, with
piij the payoff when pure strategy i is played against pure strategy j. The payoff obtained by an
individual playing strategy x when matched with an individual playing y is then: pi(x, y) = xAy We
can rewrite the payoffs in function of the matrix payoff A:
Π1 = x
1
[
(1− λ)(1− φ12)Ax1 + λ(1− φ12)Ax2
]
+ φ12x
1Ax1
Π2 = x
2
[
(1− λ)(1− φ12)Ax1 + λ(1− φ12)Ax2
]
+ φ12x
2Ax2
Πτ = x
τ
[
((1− λ)(1− σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ)Ax1 + (λ(1− σ) + λ(1− λ)Γ)Ax2]+ σxτAxτ
Let α1, α2, ατ ∈ [0, 1] be the probabilities that θ1, θ2, θτ individuals attach to the first pure strat-
egy: x1 = (α1, 1 − α1), x2 = (α2, 1 − α2) and xτ = (ατ , 1 − ατ ). When x1 6= x2, there exists γ ∈ R
such that xτ = γx1 + (1− γ)x2 = (γα1 + (1− γ)α2, 1− γα1 − (1− γ)α2).
From Payoff Equality, we know that Π1 = Π2 = Πθ. Thus, γΠ1 + (1− γ)Π2 = Πθ. We can then
write the difference between the payoff of the residents and the payoff of the mutants as follows:
Πθ −Πτ = γΠ1 + (1− γ)Π2 −Πτ
= [γφ12 − γ2σ − γ(1− λ)(φ12 − σ) + γλ(1− λ)Γ] · x1Ax1
+ [−γ(1− γ)σ − γλ(φ12 − σ)− γλ(1− λ)Γ] · x1Ax2
+ [−γ(1− γ)σ − (1− γ)(1− λ)(φ12 − σ) + (1− γ)λ(1− λ)Γ] · x2Ax1
+ [(1− γ)φ12 − (1− γ)2σ − (1− γ)λ(φ12 − σ)− (1− γ)λ(1− λ)Γ] · x2Ax2
Rearranging, we get:
Πθ −Πτ = [γ(1− γ)σ + γλ(φ12 − σ) + γλ(1− λ)Γ] · [x1Ax1 − x1Ax2 − x2Ax1 + x2Ax2]
+ [(1− γ − λ)(φ12 − σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ] · [x2A(x2 − x1)]
We can further develop this expression, using the pure-strategies payoffs:
x1Ax1 = α21pi11 + α1(1− α1)(pi21 + pi12) + (1− α1)2pi22
x1Ax2 = α1α2pi11 + α1(1− α2)pi12 + (1− α1)α2pi21 + (1− α1)(1− α2)pi22
x2Ax1 = α1α2pi11 + α2(1− α1)pi12 + (1− α2)α1pi21 + (1− α1)(1− α2)pi22
x2Ax2 = α22pi11 + α2(1− α2)(pi21 + pi12) + (1− α2)2pi22
(C.5)
Therefore:
x1Ax1 − x1Ax2 − x2Ax1 + x2Ax2 = (α1 − α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) (C.6)
x2A(x2 − x1) = (α1 − α2)[α2(pi12 − pi11) + (1− α2)(pi22 − pi21)]
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Consequently, the difference in payoff when the share of the mutant goes to zero is:
Πθ −Πτ = [γ(1− γ)σ + γλ(φ12 − σ) + γλ(1− λ)Γ] · (α1 − α2)2 · (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21)
+ [(1− γ − λ)(φ12 − σ)− λ(1− λ)Γ] · (α1 − α2) · [α2(pi12 − pi11) + (1− α2)(pi22 − pi21)]
(C.7)
When the assortment is uniformly constant, φ12 = σ and Γ = 0. Thus, we obtain:
Πθ −Πτ = γ(1− γ)σ(α1 − α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) (C.8)
AppendixC.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows two steps. First, we show that there always exists a mutant type that earns
strictly more than the residents at the limit. Then, we extend this result to a small neighborhood by
continuity.
Note that if the population does not respect the Payoff Equality condition, it is not evolutionarily
stable. Thus, we consider next a population that respects the Payoff Equality condition (Proposition
2).
If x1 = x2 = xθ /∈ Xσ, then there exists xˆ ∈ X such that uσ(xθ, xθ) < uσ(xˆ, xθ), i.e. pi(xθ, xθ) <
(1 − σ)pi(xˆ, xθ) + σpi(xˆ, xˆ). At the limit when the population share of the mutant goes to zero, this
inequality is equivalent to Πθ < Πτ , for a mutant playing xˆ. Moreover, since Θ is rich, there exists a
type θτ ∈ Θ for which xˆ is strictly dominant, i.e. θτ always play xˆ.
If x1 6= x2, we know from Lemma 2 that the difference in payoffs between the residents and
mutants τ at the limit satisfies:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)(α1 − α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21)
From (C.6), we know that Spi = (α1−α2)2 (pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21).40 Hence, rewriting the expression
above, we have:
Πθ −Πτ = σγ(1− γ)Spi
We consider the three different cases of Lemma 3:
1. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 > 0, then Xσ ⊆ {0, 1},
Since Θ is rich, if θ1 or θ2 individuals do not play pure strategies, it is always possible to
find a mutant playing a strategy xˆ such that γ(1 − γ) < 0 (discussion of Fig.3). In this case,
the difference between the two payoffs above is negative and the mutant earns more than the
residents at the limit since σ > 0.
Else, if θ1 and θ2 individuals both play pure strategies, then since (x1, x2) /∈ X2σ, we have
Xσ = {0} or Xσ = {1}. Thus, one type is playing the Hamiltonian strategy. Without loss
of generality and by symmetry, suppose θ1 individuals are playing the Hamiltonian strategy,
and that Xσ = {1} i.e. θ1 individuals play the first pure strategy while θ2 individuals play the
second pure strategy. We then have Spi = pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 > 0 and we are in case 2. or 3.
of Proposition 2. So we also have Qpi, Rpi ≥ 0. Let x ∈ X, such that x 6= x2, i.e. x = (η, 1− η)
40Recall that Spi = pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 where piij denotes the payoff obtained by individual θi against individual
θj ; while piij denotes the payoff of playing pure strategy i against pure strategy j.
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with η ∈ (0, 1]. Then:
(1− σ)pi(x, x2) + σpi(x, x) = pi22 − ηRpi − ση(1− η)Spi
< pi22
Thus, for all x in X such that x 6= x2, uσ(x, x2) < uσ(x2, x2). This means that the strategy
played by individuals θ2, i.e. the second pure strategy, is also a Hamiltonian strategy. Con-
sequently, Xσ = {0, 1} which contradicts the assumption (x1, x2) /∈ X2σ. Hence, this case is
impossible.
2. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 = 0, then we have Spi = 0 (α1 6= α2 else the residents play the same
strategy). Thus, from Proposition 2, we also have Qpi = Rpi = 0. Subtracting, the expression
Qpi − Spi, using (C.5), we find:
Qpi − Spi = (α1 − α2)[α2(1 + σ)(pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21) + (pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22)]
Hence, we have pi12 + σpi21 − (1 + σ)pi22 = 0. Therefore, case 2. of Lemma 3 implies that
Xσ = [0, 1] which contradicts the assumption (x1, x2) /∈ X2σ, and this case is impossible.
3. If pi11 + pi22 − pi12 − pi21 < 0, then since Θ is rich, it is always possible to find a mutant playing
a strategy xˆ such that γ(1 − γ) > 0 (discussion of Fig.3) so that the mutants earn more than
the residents at the limit since σ > 0.
Consequently, in the different cases when (x1, x2) /∈ X2σ and Θ is rich, we have shown that there
exists a mutant type θτ that earns strictly more than the residents at the limit by being committed
to a strategy xˆ:
Π1(x
1, x2, xˆ, λ, 0) < Πτ (x
1, x2, xˆ, λ, 0)
and Π2(x
1, x2, xˆ, λ, 0) < Πτ (x
1, x2, xˆ, λ, 0)
By continuity of the payoffs, these strict inequalities hold for all (x, y, xˆ) in a neighborhood U ⊂ X3×
(0, 1)× [0, 1) of (x1, x2, xˆ, λ, 0). Using Lemma 1, we know that BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , ·) : (0, 1)× [0, 1)⇒ X3
is closed-valued and upper hemi-continuous. If (x1t , x2t , xˆt) ∈ BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λt, εt) for all t ∈ N,
(λt, εt)→ (λ, 0) and
〈
(x1t , x
2
t , xˆt)
〉
t∈N converges, then the limit point (x
1∗, x2∗, xˆ∗) necessarily belongs
to BNE(θ1, θ2, θτ , λ, 0) which is a singleton by assumption, i.e. (x1∗, x2∗, xˆ∗) = (x1, x2, xˆ). Moreover,
since θτ is committed to strategy xˆ, for all t ∈ N xˆt = xˆ. Thus, for any given ε¯ > 0, there exists
a T such that, for all t > T , 0 < εt < ε¯ and (x1t , x2t , xˆ, λt, εt) ∈ U , so that Π1(x1t , x2t , xˆ, λt, εt) <
Πτ (x
1
t , x
2
t , xˆ, λt, εt) and Π2(x1t , x2t , xˆ, λt, εt) < Πτ (x1t , x2t , xˆ, λt, εt).
AppendixC.6 Proof of Proposition 4
First note that homo oeconomicus individuals always defect while homo kantiensis individuals
always cooperate. If there exists a heterogeneous evolutionarily stable population of homo oeconomicus
and homo kantiensis, we know from Proposition 3 that {0, 1} ∈ Xσ. From Lemma 3, we either have
Xσ = {0, 1} and piCC+piDD−piDC−piCD > 0 orXσ = [0, 1] and piCC+piDD−piDC−piCD = 0. But in the
latter case, the game is additive and the population cannot be evolutionarily stable. Thus,Xσ = {0, 1}
and piCC +piDD−piDC−piCD > 0. This also means that Spi > 0. Since σ < 1 (else the Payoff Equality
can not be respected since homo kantiensis would earn more than homo oeconomicus by only meeting
similar others), from Proposition 2 we also have Qpi > 0 and Rpi > 0. Let homo kantiensis be type
θ1, then Qpi = piCC − piDC − σ(piDD − piDC) and Rpi = piDD − piCD − σ(piCC − piCD). Since we have
piCD < piDD < piCC < piDC , we obtain (piDC −piCC)/(piDC −piDD) < σ < (piDD−piCD)/(piCC −piCD).
40
If piCC +piDD −piDC −piCD > 0, then from Lemma 3 we have Xσ ⊆ {0, 1}. Moreover, individuals
homo oeconomicus always defect, while homo kantiensis always cooperate. Thus, Spi = piCC +piDD−
piDC − piCD > 0. Since (piDC − piCC)/(piDC − piDD) < σ < (piDD − piCD)/(piCC − piCD), we have
Qpi = piCC −piDC −σ(piDD−piDC) > 0 and Rpi = piDD−piCD−σ(piCC −piCD) > 0. From Proposition
2, we know that λ = Qpi/((1 − σ)Spi) ∈ (0, 1) satisfies Payoff Equality. Moreover, using the same
arguments than in the proof of Proposition 3 (case 1 when x1 6= x2), we can show that Xσ = {0, 1}.
Consequently, from Theorem 2, we can conclude that the population of homo oeconomicus and homo
kantiensis with λ = Qpi/((1− σ)Spi) is evolutionarily stable.
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